The causality argument for Causal Determinism argues what?

[LakersFan]

a. via analogous induction from causes of normal events to causes of events involving choice.
b. from the logical implication of the verb “is” in statements about causes of future events.
c. from the logical implication of God’s (or the Oracle’s) knowledge of the causes of future events.
d. from the implication that people are not the cause of their own actions and therefore cannot be held responsible for them.
e. none of the above.

 

[yaoishonenai]

D. It isn't that we are not the cause of our own actions, however. Determinists believe that we do have will power, but that it is not "free will" power, meaning this:

We would not (probably) have chosen to be put in the position of making the choices we are forced to make by the circumstance that "cause us to be fully cause creatures."

Tom Clark, of Naturalism.Org and I have debated the metaphysics of "free will." We agree to disagree because free will has been adequately described as the freedom to think.......or not.

Tom thinks that for the will to be free it must be free of the causes which make us. That is called "contra causal" will.

If we were free of the influences that cause us, we would, in effect, be free of reality. Then there would be no reason to choose to act in the first place.