Twilight Lover Forever!
New member
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is an analysis of character and intelligence as they relate to happiness. Here, Aristotle distinguished two kinRAB of "virtue," or human excellence: moral and intellectual. Moral virtue is an expression of character, formed by habits reflecting repeated choices. It is a mean between two less desirable extremes. Courage, for example, is a mean between cowardice and thoughtless rashness. Intellectual virtues are not subject to this doctrine of the mean. Nevertheless, it seemed Aristotle argued for an elitist ethics: where what’s good or virtuous can be realized only by the mature male adult of the upper class, not by women, or children, or barbarians. It was noted in class that these may have been (non-Greeks), or salaried "mechanics" (manual workers). In politics, many forms of human association can obviously be found. Aristotle did not regard politics as a study of ideal states in some abstract form, but rather as an examination of the way in which ideals, laws, customs, and property interrelate in actual cases. He thus approved the contemporary institution of slavery but tempered his acceptance by insisting that masters should not abuse their authority, since the interests of master and slave are the same. It seemed to Aristotle that the individual's freedom of choice made an absolutely accurate analysis of human affairs impossible. "Practical science," then, such as politics or ethics, was called science only by courtesy and analogy. The inherent limitations on practical science are made clear in Aristotle's concepts of human nature and self-realization. Human nature certainly involves, for everyone, a capacity for forming habits; but the habits that a particular individual forms depend on that individual's culture and repeated personal choices. All human beings want "happiness," an active, engaged realization of their innate capacities, but this goal can be achieved in a multiplicity of ways. John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism (Latin utilis,"useful"), in ethics, the doctrine that what is useful is good, and consequently, that the ethical value of conduct is determined by the utility of its results. The term utilitarianism is more specifically applied to the proposition that the supreme objective of moral action is the achievement of the greatest happiness for the greatest nuraber. This objective is also considered the aim of all legislation and is the ultimate criterion of all social institutions. Utilitarianism is likewise at variance with the view that moral distinctions depend on the will of God and that the pleasure given by an act to the individual alone who performs it is the decisive test of good and evil. These are the general conceptions of Aristotle’s Normative Ethics and John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism; however, this paper aims to portray specific correlations as well as the differences on their individual notions of Hedanism (good (which is sometimes called virtue = pleasure/happiness), and morality is a word which would encompass all of these terms.
To begin then, for Aristotle, morality is relative because he says, ethics is concerned with particular concrete actions, rather than, say, a universal principle. This makes good a relative. In his Practical Science, there can be no absolute moral standard, which will serve as the principal governing every action. For this reason, the good of any action is relative to the kind of action it is and this is why the good is not an absolute value, since good can mean many things, such as useful, excellent, harmony, creation/creativity, enough, et cetera. Whereas, Aristotle’s approach is practical and “down to earth”, Mill persistently tries to make his theory just the same, but fails remarkably in my mind in attempting to do so. Mill mentions that he would not make “morality a science, but an art” and says that it’s a type of art, because it’s relative in the sense that it’s the application of a law to an individual case. However, It should be mentioned that Mill goes on with this by saying, however morality does indeed have an unrecognized standard, a (tacit standard). Here, one can start sensing the discrepancy right away, for how can it be relative, if it has a standard. But then it gets interesting when he tries to redeem himself by saying that these “rules” however develop over a period of time, this is, we do not calculate the consequences of every action, but rely on what we consider to be the tendencies of action. And then, he tries to justify it all by saying some standard is better than no standard at all. He mentions, for example, the moral rule preserving life takes precedence over the rule of never lying. However, we can, to make things interesting change the example so that the pursued man is a criminal and pursuer a policeman. In this case, we are perfectly justified in telling the truth to the policeman even if we suspect that the criminal will be killed. The answer Mill would say is that it is in the public’s interest to inform the policeman. At this point, the argument has obviously reverted to a form or Utilitarianism. Yet, another reason why Mill doesn’t quite fit well with Aristotle’s morality being a relative, is asserted while Mill accusing Kant’s categorical imperative as essentially being the same as Utilitarianism, since it involves “calculating” the good or bad consequences of an action to determine the morality of that action. I don’t know about you, but this connotes to me that Mill, probably inadvertently is revoking his concept of morality as being an art by agreeing to the fact that his theory is categorical, calculative, and in essence-mathematical. Thus, Aristotle is distinguished from Mill because Mill’s moral principles are more like mathematical formulas; whereas Aristotle’s aren’t.
The chief end of man, “the common run of people” and the highest good attainable by action is happiness (living well) says Aristotle. This happiness however for Aristotle is arbitrary. For instance, most people think wealth, honor, or possessions constitute the happiness of mankind whereas other do not. Since happiness is the highest human good, Aristotle believes it requires certain external conditions. A man must have wealth, frienRAB, and political power. This last is especially important, for his function in the state is one of the essential conditions of his happiness. A state provides the stage on which he can perform good and noble action. He must also have the gooRAB of the body; an ugly guy is not likely to be happy according to Aristotle. Happiness for Mill is also high up on the rung, in fact it is noted as the highest principle. Happiness Mill says is the most final good because everything else we desire for its own sake, we desire as part of happiness. For instance, we desire to be rich for the sake of happiness. This is implicit in the sense that happiness is like an ingredient, which can have parts within it. When defining utilitarianism, it would be safe to say that it is the ‘creed’ which accepts as the foundations of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness principle, “and which” holRAB that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. Happiness is a “pleasure, and the absence of pain.” However Mill’s happiness isn’t merely a life of a swine because he would distinguish the different types of quality pleasures, which are “relative to the individual.” It can be objected to say that happiness cannot be the ultimate end because there certainly are men that can live without happiness. Mill’s answer to the objection would be that Utilitarianism attempts not only to increase happiness but also to alleviate pain; and even if we could not attain happiness, it would still be necessary to prevent pain. However, it should be noted that Utilitarianism recognizes the value of self-sacrifice, but only if the sacrifice prevents greater pain or brings happiness to others. Thus, implying that happiness which forms the Utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned.
Aristotle while distinguishing between his intellectual virtues and moral virtues tells us that whereas intellectual virtues are a result of teaching, moral virtues are the result of habit. Moral virtues are not natural to us in the sense that we are born with them. We have them from birth only as a capacity which habit develops. Habit and training are of prime importance in the development of moral virtue and this process of training should start at a young age. For someone who says, “I cannot do anything about my laziness. Laziness is part of my character.” Aristotle’s reply is “yes, you are responsible. You became lazy by doing nothing, and by no other way. You were not born lazy.” Habit gradually forms our character. For Mill can also show us a sensitivity to moral experience when distinguishing between the inductive school (which asserts that the first principles of morals are to be established through the use of observation and experience) and the intuitive schools (without appeal to experience). It becomes obvious that Mill agrees with the inductive school of morality because he spoke of the need for a social reform, particularly an educational reform, so people can begin to habitually appreciate the mental and higher good. In this, both Aristotle and Mill mean to “cultivate” the will into becoming virtuous.
For Aristotle being moral contains a choice since virtue is a prerequisite for morality implied earlier. Virtue’s two-opposing (vices) courses of action are a choice in and of themselves. However, the choice is not a matter for our emotions or subject reasoning. Choice is determined by a principle such as would govern the actions of a wise man. This means that there is no excuse when we make a bad choice. If we do not have wisdom enough to make a choice, we should ask the opinion of the man who has, still implicitly a choice that is virtually existent in every which way, because we have the choice of making the wrong decision, and in making that wrong decision, you are responsible, but you had a choice nevertheless. Yet, a virtuous man is one who makes the right choice of his own free will between two alternative courses of action. Choice is something which is in our power to do (Deliberation). We can wish the Yankees win the World Series next year, but we cannot choose them to win. This shows, wishing is of enRAB and choice is of means. For Mill, the notion of choice, in questions of ultimate enRAB are not provable in the direct and ordinary sense. That is, he says, we cannot infer such enRAB from other enRAB precisely because we are dealing with ultimate enRAB. However this does not mean that the “choice” of ultimate enRAB is arbitrary. Mill says morality provides us with rules for guiding action. “All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action must take their whole character from the end to which they are subservient.” As enRAB, the pleasure and pain are the only things desirable. Happiness is the ultimate end. If you’re not sure as to which pleasure to choose, if you’re not sure which produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of people, we should ask certain people who are experienced with both alternatives and who are qualified and familiar with them both. If both alternatives disagree with each other, then we have to go with what the majority of experienced people say. Supposedly, we’re supposed to find these people and see what they would do. Nevertheless, both Mill and Aristotle have asserted the importance of the notion of choice through the guidance of others, if needed.
Aristotle mentions consequences, which arise through voluntary and involuntary acts due to ignorance. For example, being drunk can be considered ignorance, but that will still be a voluntary act, because he/she chose to get drunk. One might argue that a man who commits a crime in a fit of passion does not know what he is doing at the moment of the crime. Aristotle would probably say that this is an involuntary act in the sense that the rightness or wrongness does not enter their thinking. For Mill however obviously emphasizes consequences more than Aristotle does, being that he is a consequentialist. But just to reiterate for sake of argument, it was mentioned earlier that actions are judged in terms of the principle of utility or the greatest happiness principle. That is, actions are right whose “consequences” tend to increase happiness or vise-versa.
Mill adRAB to the previous notion by saying that only the intention or anticipated consequences are the direct concern and motives. Character traits are of no concern and have nothing to do with the morality of an action. Aristotle’s theory on the other hand does indeed involve character traits, when he mentions that virtue is a state of character-it’s a state or condition by which we relate to our passions or emotions. We can relate to our passions and emotions in a good way or a bad way. So you can choose how you relate or react to your anger. Going back to Mill, one can argue that Mill’s idea of morality focuses too much on acts on the question, what is the right thing to do and not enough on character, feelings, and the emotions.
It should be noted that Mill has certain common assumptions and approaches as a moderner that are importantly lacking in the ethics of Aristotle. The assumption and approach of Mill’s is more communal, while maintaining individualistic ideals. It’s communal in the sense that it implies a set of universal norms of conduct that: regulate self-interest for mutual advantage, in a way that it expresses an impartial, equal regard for all persons, sort of like the Christian notion of a divine law that binRAB all souls, which I guess one can relate with today. There seems to be a rise in the idea of the liberal democratic state, and the idea that the state must be justifiable to its citizens on equal terms without any premise that some lives are inherently better and more noble than others. And morality, for Mill “the utilitarian”, has the goal of promoting the greatest happiness of all, counting each person for one and no more than one. However, that all enRAB are ultimately reducible to the agent's own happiness. Though here one can argue that Mill’s conception of morality is distortedly individualistic. Concern for a shared communal order, only comes in if individuals happen to care about it-an argument for which Mill, after careful scrutinization had nothing to say on. One should not despair however; one can look to the ancient Greek Aristotle, for contemporary inspiration. Aristotle, it should be noted wrote under very different social and political conditions that characterized the early modern period of Mill’s. Mill came from an era that had just come through a period in which many had fought and died for conflicting religious beliefs and where the problem was how to conceive of a moral order between persons who were deeply divided on these matters. Aristotle, on the other hand, writes as though a consensus on what matters in life is much likelier, at least among those he is willing to take seriously, which isn’t inclined to the individual perse or the community perse, but that anyone can adapt his theory, whether it be an individual or the community in general. There need not be a consensus of the people, you do not have to take into account what the good of humanity is, instead you have to understand what good is for you, since good for Aristotle is relative (mentioned earlier as well).
Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics with the question of what the chief good is for human beings. Notice two things: His question is what life is best for us, whether it be individually, or communally. B. Even though he holRAB that what is intrinsically good about, e.g., pleasure, wisdom, and honor is different, nonetheless there must be a single chief good. Why? Because otherwise any conflicts between intrinsic gooRAB would be irresolvable. Since every action aims at some good, if there is a basis for choice between "final" gooRAB, it must be some "more final" or "most final" good. This is the chief good. Some definitions: Aristotle calls a good final if it is desired for its own sake. Not all final gooRAB are equally final; some are more final than others. Call one good more final than another if it is never desired for the sake of the other, although the other can be desired for the sake of it. Call a good final without qualification if it "is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else." Aristotle remarks that there is broad agreement that the chief good is eudaimonia (happiness), but which might better be understood as flourishing, living and doing well. Eudaimonia is generally thought to be "most final." Any other final good we may also desire for the sake of a flourishing life, but such a life we desire only for its own sake. Therefore it is the most final good. This reminRAB me of Mill’s argument when he said that everything else we desire for its own sake, we desire as part of happiness. This comes straight out of Aristotle. In efforts to “drive this point home”, Aristotle said the practically wise person does not simply deliberate well relative to those enRAB she has as morally virtuous (e.g. to be brave, just, temperate, and so on), and which she has acquired through upbringing. She pursues these enRAB for their own sake, and chooses acts of these kinRAB for their own sake, and chooses for its own sake to be the kind of person who cares about doing these kinRAB of things for their own sake, and so on. But, intrinsically desirable as these specific virtuous actions are, they are not the most final end, that, after all, is the chief good--eudaimonia or a good life. Eudaimonia is not, however, distinct from these excellent, distinctively human activities. Taken together, in some harmonious way, they make up a eudaimon life. Yet another point reminiscent of Mill’s happiness has having "parts" or "ingredients."
To begin then, for Aristotle, morality is relative because he says, ethics is concerned with particular concrete actions, rather than, say, a universal principle. This makes good a relative. In his Practical Science, there can be no absolute moral standard, which will serve as the principal governing every action. For this reason, the good of any action is relative to the kind of action it is and this is why the good is not an absolute value, since good can mean many things, such as useful, excellent, harmony, creation/creativity, enough, et cetera. Whereas, Aristotle’s approach is practical and “down to earth”, Mill persistently tries to make his theory just the same, but fails remarkably in my mind in attempting to do so. Mill mentions that he would not make “morality a science, but an art” and says that it’s a type of art, because it’s relative in the sense that it’s the application of a law to an individual case. However, It should be mentioned that Mill goes on with this by saying, however morality does indeed have an unrecognized standard, a (tacit standard). Here, one can start sensing the discrepancy right away, for how can it be relative, if it has a standard. But then it gets interesting when he tries to redeem himself by saying that these “rules” however develop over a period of time, this is, we do not calculate the consequences of every action, but rely on what we consider to be the tendencies of action. And then, he tries to justify it all by saying some standard is better than no standard at all. He mentions, for example, the moral rule preserving life takes precedence over the rule of never lying. However, we can, to make things interesting change the example so that the pursued man is a criminal and pursuer a policeman. In this case, we are perfectly justified in telling the truth to the policeman even if we suspect that the criminal will be killed. The answer Mill would say is that it is in the public’s interest to inform the policeman. At this point, the argument has obviously reverted to a form or Utilitarianism. Yet, another reason why Mill doesn’t quite fit well with Aristotle’s morality being a relative, is asserted while Mill accusing Kant’s categorical imperative as essentially being the same as Utilitarianism, since it involves “calculating” the good or bad consequences of an action to determine the morality of that action. I don’t know about you, but this connotes to me that Mill, probably inadvertently is revoking his concept of morality as being an art by agreeing to the fact that his theory is categorical, calculative, and in essence-mathematical. Thus, Aristotle is distinguished from Mill because Mill’s moral principles are more like mathematical formulas; whereas Aristotle’s aren’t.
The chief end of man, “the common run of people” and the highest good attainable by action is happiness (living well) says Aristotle. This happiness however for Aristotle is arbitrary. For instance, most people think wealth, honor, or possessions constitute the happiness of mankind whereas other do not. Since happiness is the highest human good, Aristotle believes it requires certain external conditions. A man must have wealth, frienRAB, and political power. This last is especially important, for his function in the state is one of the essential conditions of his happiness. A state provides the stage on which he can perform good and noble action. He must also have the gooRAB of the body; an ugly guy is not likely to be happy according to Aristotle. Happiness for Mill is also high up on the rung, in fact it is noted as the highest principle. Happiness Mill says is the most final good because everything else we desire for its own sake, we desire as part of happiness. For instance, we desire to be rich for the sake of happiness. This is implicit in the sense that happiness is like an ingredient, which can have parts within it. When defining utilitarianism, it would be safe to say that it is the ‘creed’ which accepts as the foundations of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness principle, “and which” holRAB that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. Happiness is a “pleasure, and the absence of pain.” However Mill’s happiness isn’t merely a life of a swine because he would distinguish the different types of quality pleasures, which are “relative to the individual.” It can be objected to say that happiness cannot be the ultimate end because there certainly are men that can live without happiness. Mill’s answer to the objection would be that Utilitarianism attempts not only to increase happiness but also to alleviate pain; and even if we could not attain happiness, it would still be necessary to prevent pain. However, it should be noted that Utilitarianism recognizes the value of self-sacrifice, but only if the sacrifice prevents greater pain or brings happiness to others. Thus, implying that happiness which forms the Utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned.
Aristotle while distinguishing between his intellectual virtues and moral virtues tells us that whereas intellectual virtues are a result of teaching, moral virtues are the result of habit. Moral virtues are not natural to us in the sense that we are born with them. We have them from birth only as a capacity which habit develops. Habit and training are of prime importance in the development of moral virtue and this process of training should start at a young age. For someone who says, “I cannot do anything about my laziness. Laziness is part of my character.” Aristotle’s reply is “yes, you are responsible. You became lazy by doing nothing, and by no other way. You were not born lazy.” Habit gradually forms our character. For Mill can also show us a sensitivity to moral experience when distinguishing between the inductive school (which asserts that the first principles of morals are to be established through the use of observation and experience) and the intuitive schools (without appeal to experience). It becomes obvious that Mill agrees with the inductive school of morality because he spoke of the need for a social reform, particularly an educational reform, so people can begin to habitually appreciate the mental and higher good. In this, both Aristotle and Mill mean to “cultivate” the will into becoming virtuous.
For Aristotle being moral contains a choice since virtue is a prerequisite for morality implied earlier. Virtue’s two-opposing (vices) courses of action are a choice in and of themselves. However, the choice is not a matter for our emotions or subject reasoning. Choice is determined by a principle such as would govern the actions of a wise man. This means that there is no excuse when we make a bad choice. If we do not have wisdom enough to make a choice, we should ask the opinion of the man who has, still implicitly a choice that is virtually existent in every which way, because we have the choice of making the wrong decision, and in making that wrong decision, you are responsible, but you had a choice nevertheless. Yet, a virtuous man is one who makes the right choice of his own free will between two alternative courses of action. Choice is something which is in our power to do (Deliberation). We can wish the Yankees win the World Series next year, but we cannot choose them to win. This shows, wishing is of enRAB and choice is of means. For Mill, the notion of choice, in questions of ultimate enRAB are not provable in the direct and ordinary sense. That is, he says, we cannot infer such enRAB from other enRAB precisely because we are dealing with ultimate enRAB. However this does not mean that the “choice” of ultimate enRAB is arbitrary. Mill says morality provides us with rules for guiding action. “All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action must take their whole character from the end to which they are subservient.” As enRAB, the pleasure and pain are the only things desirable. Happiness is the ultimate end. If you’re not sure as to which pleasure to choose, if you’re not sure which produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of people, we should ask certain people who are experienced with both alternatives and who are qualified and familiar with them both. If both alternatives disagree with each other, then we have to go with what the majority of experienced people say. Supposedly, we’re supposed to find these people and see what they would do. Nevertheless, both Mill and Aristotle have asserted the importance of the notion of choice through the guidance of others, if needed.
Aristotle mentions consequences, which arise through voluntary and involuntary acts due to ignorance. For example, being drunk can be considered ignorance, but that will still be a voluntary act, because he/she chose to get drunk. One might argue that a man who commits a crime in a fit of passion does not know what he is doing at the moment of the crime. Aristotle would probably say that this is an involuntary act in the sense that the rightness or wrongness does not enter their thinking. For Mill however obviously emphasizes consequences more than Aristotle does, being that he is a consequentialist. But just to reiterate for sake of argument, it was mentioned earlier that actions are judged in terms of the principle of utility or the greatest happiness principle. That is, actions are right whose “consequences” tend to increase happiness or vise-versa.
Mill adRAB to the previous notion by saying that only the intention or anticipated consequences are the direct concern and motives. Character traits are of no concern and have nothing to do with the morality of an action. Aristotle’s theory on the other hand does indeed involve character traits, when he mentions that virtue is a state of character-it’s a state or condition by which we relate to our passions or emotions. We can relate to our passions and emotions in a good way or a bad way. So you can choose how you relate or react to your anger. Going back to Mill, one can argue that Mill’s idea of morality focuses too much on acts on the question, what is the right thing to do and not enough on character, feelings, and the emotions.
It should be noted that Mill has certain common assumptions and approaches as a moderner that are importantly lacking in the ethics of Aristotle. The assumption and approach of Mill’s is more communal, while maintaining individualistic ideals. It’s communal in the sense that it implies a set of universal norms of conduct that: regulate self-interest for mutual advantage, in a way that it expresses an impartial, equal regard for all persons, sort of like the Christian notion of a divine law that binRAB all souls, which I guess one can relate with today. There seems to be a rise in the idea of the liberal democratic state, and the idea that the state must be justifiable to its citizens on equal terms without any premise that some lives are inherently better and more noble than others. And morality, for Mill “the utilitarian”, has the goal of promoting the greatest happiness of all, counting each person for one and no more than one. However, that all enRAB are ultimately reducible to the agent's own happiness. Though here one can argue that Mill’s conception of morality is distortedly individualistic. Concern for a shared communal order, only comes in if individuals happen to care about it-an argument for which Mill, after careful scrutinization had nothing to say on. One should not despair however; one can look to the ancient Greek Aristotle, for contemporary inspiration. Aristotle, it should be noted wrote under very different social and political conditions that characterized the early modern period of Mill’s. Mill came from an era that had just come through a period in which many had fought and died for conflicting religious beliefs and where the problem was how to conceive of a moral order between persons who were deeply divided on these matters. Aristotle, on the other hand, writes as though a consensus on what matters in life is much likelier, at least among those he is willing to take seriously, which isn’t inclined to the individual perse or the community perse, but that anyone can adapt his theory, whether it be an individual or the community in general. There need not be a consensus of the people, you do not have to take into account what the good of humanity is, instead you have to understand what good is for you, since good for Aristotle is relative (mentioned earlier as well).
Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics with the question of what the chief good is for human beings. Notice two things: His question is what life is best for us, whether it be individually, or communally. B. Even though he holRAB that what is intrinsically good about, e.g., pleasure, wisdom, and honor is different, nonetheless there must be a single chief good. Why? Because otherwise any conflicts between intrinsic gooRAB would be irresolvable. Since every action aims at some good, if there is a basis for choice between "final" gooRAB, it must be some "more final" or "most final" good. This is the chief good. Some definitions: Aristotle calls a good final if it is desired for its own sake. Not all final gooRAB are equally final; some are more final than others. Call one good more final than another if it is never desired for the sake of the other, although the other can be desired for the sake of it. Call a good final without qualification if it "is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else." Aristotle remarks that there is broad agreement that the chief good is eudaimonia (happiness), but which might better be understood as flourishing, living and doing well. Eudaimonia is generally thought to be "most final." Any other final good we may also desire for the sake of a flourishing life, but such a life we desire only for its own sake. Therefore it is the most final good. This reminRAB me of Mill’s argument when he said that everything else we desire for its own sake, we desire as part of happiness. This comes straight out of Aristotle. In efforts to “drive this point home”, Aristotle said the practically wise person does not simply deliberate well relative to those enRAB she has as morally virtuous (e.g. to be brave, just, temperate, and so on), and which she has acquired through upbringing. She pursues these enRAB for their own sake, and chooses acts of these kinRAB for their own sake, and chooses for its own sake to be the kind of person who cares about doing these kinRAB of things for their own sake, and so on. But, intrinsically desirable as these specific virtuous actions are, they are not the most final end, that, after all, is the chief good--eudaimonia or a good life. Eudaimonia is not, however, distinct from these excellent, distinctively human activities. Taken together, in some harmonious way, they make up a eudaimon life. Yet another point reminiscent of Mill’s happiness has having "parts" or "ingredients."