related articles
Netanyahu trying to convince Israeli hawks he won the Gaza war
By Yossi Verter | Nov.23,2012 | 11:55 PM |
52
Behind the scenes of Israel's decision to accept Gaza truce
By Barak Ravid | Nov.23,2012 | 11:55 PM |
19
The prime minister had no other choice: The barrage of rockets fired at Negev communities at increasingly shorter intervals, alongside Hamas’ effort to impede military patrols even on the Israeli side of the Gaza border, pushed Benjamin Netanyahu into a corner. Allegations about residents of the south being abandoned, which were leveled at his government precisely at the onset of the election campaign, forced it to respond. The decision to launch the operation with the assassination of Hamas military commander Ahmed Jabari and the destruction of a Fajr missile arsenal was reasonable, under the circumstances. Far from the sort of warmongering leader often depicted by the media, Netanyahu knew he could probably anticipate some sort of achievement, albeit limited.
Israel seems to have two radical options for dealing with the insufferable reality along the Gaza border: It can overthrow the Hamas regime via an expansive, prolonged military action, or it can try to reach a long-term diplomatic arrangement with the Islamist organization.
Notwithstanding the vociferous demands by the right wing during Operation Pillar of Defense, the first alternative is not viable at the moment. Israel is afraid of its implications, including: the deaths of many soldiers during a ground operation
Netanyahu trying to convince Israeli hawks he won the Gaza war
By Yossi Verter | Nov.23,2012 | 11:55 PM |
Behind the scenes of Israel's decision to accept Gaza truce
By Barak Ravid | Nov.23,2012 | 11:55 PM |
The prime minister had no other choice: The barrage of rockets fired at Negev communities at increasingly shorter intervals, alongside Hamas’ effort to impede military patrols even on the Israeli side of the Gaza border, pushed Benjamin Netanyahu into a corner. Allegations about residents of the south being abandoned, which were leveled at his government precisely at the onset of the election campaign, forced it to respond. The decision to launch the operation with the assassination of Hamas military commander Ahmed Jabari and the destruction of a Fajr missile arsenal was reasonable, under the circumstances. Far from the sort of warmongering leader often depicted by the media, Netanyahu knew he could probably anticipate some sort of achievement, albeit limited.
Israel seems to have two radical options for dealing with the insufferable reality along the Gaza border: It can overthrow the Hamas regime via an expansive, prolonged military action, or it can try to reach a long-term diplomatic arrangement with the Islamist organization.
Notwithstanding the vociferous demands by the right wing during Operation Pillar of Defense, the first alternative is not viable at the moment. Israel is afraid of its implications, including: the deaths of many soldiers during a ground operation