The state comptroller, Micha Lindenstrauss, published at noon (Wednesday) his report concerning the events surrounding the May 2010 'Mavi Marmara' event. In his report, Lindenstrauss pointed out that there were flaws in the decision-making process leading up to the IDF's takeover of the Turkish vessel. According to the comptroller, one of the reasons for these failures is that a proper meeting of the political-security cabinet about the issue, or a different meeting of ministers, never took place. The comptroller further said that Netanyahu's behavior was "in contrast to the standards set after the Winograd committee," which looked into the failures of the Second Lebanon War.
The comptroller noted in his report that in the weeks prior to the flotilla, Defense Minister Ehud Barak offered Netanyahu to hold such a meeting on two separate occasions. In addition, Minister Moshe Ya'alon mentioned the issue to Netanyahu three times. In spite of these urgings, Netanyahu's answer was: "yes, yes, we should prepare…" Ya'alon said to the comptroller that "reason holds – I thought – that we should have held a meeting about this issue, and include all government ministers. In retrospect, I can say that the Defense Minister prevented such a meeting from taking place, claiming that it was his jurisdiction."
Speaking with the state comptroller in February 2011, Netanyahu claimed that meetings were actually held, but that these were one-on-one meetings with his Military Secretary, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Defense Minister.
The comptroller wrote in his report that "even though knowledge of the Turkish flotilla existed since early 2010, and even though the Prime Minister recognized that this flotilla was different from previous ones, his decisions were made independently of any official administrative preparation. His decisions were made based on undocumented and impromptu, separate meetings between the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister, and between the PM and Minister of Foreign Affairs. […]. The PM did not head a single meeting, with the participation of relevant ministers, that aimed at preparing a strategy for operational and PR activities to prevent the flotilla from taking place […] and to prepare militarily for the flotilla."
The comptroller added that the meetings between Netanyahu and Barak and Lieberman were conducted privately, without any preparation and without any record. "It isn't clear if and what decision were made in [these meetings], and at any rate there is no documentation," emphasized the comptroller. "Therefore it is not clear how much the ministers who weren't there knew about their options in dealing with the flotilla."
The comptroller further adds that in response to one of the early drafts of the report, Netanyahu claimed that adding more meetings would not have added to his one-on-one briefings with the individual ministers. "I'm interested in the result," said Netanyahu to Lindenstrauss in one of their meetings. "Will the action take place according to how I want it or not… I don't hold meetings for their own sake. I'm the Prime Minister and at the end I have to take everything into consideration and make a decision."
Netanyahu and his staff tried to convince the comptroller that the fact that the political-security cabinet wasn't summoned was a procedural problem, not one of essence. "Taking over the Turkish vessel was a simple military operation, which the army is well-qualified to undertake. No special problem was foreseen, and in these circumstances, there was no justification to bring the issue to the cabinet," the Prime Minister's Office said to Lindenstrauss.
The report adds that finally, five days before the takeover, the "septet" forum of ministers was called in, where it was decided that the flotilla be stopped by force, and all responsibility was transferred to the Defense Minister. The comptroller criticizes harshly what took place in that meeting, concluding that it was summoned hastily, and conducted in an amateur fashion. The Prime Minister's Military Secretary [Maj. Gen.] Yochanan Locker, who called the meeting to find PR ways to deal with the flotilla, finally admitted that "at the end, both PR and Intelligence matters were dealt with together."
The Chief of Staff at the time, [Lt. Gen. (ret.)] Gabi Ashkenazi, said about the meeting that "it could have been handled better." The Head of the Research Department in IDF Intelligence, [Brig. Gen.] Yossi Baidatz , said that "this meeting was called in ad-hoc, and that's why there was no formal preparation for it." Nir Hefetz, the Prime Minister's Spokesman at the time, said that "the meeting was summoned out of the blue ."
Lindenstrauss criticizes that very "septet" meeting, emphasizing that Netanyahu didn't give any time to prepare, and that by that point, some of the Turkish boats had already sailed. "Participants in that meeting were not given advance notice about the purpose of the meeting, and they had no time to prepare," wrote the comptroller.
According to the report, the "septet" ministers received only a very basic briefing about the flotilla, which didn't include any discussion about possible implications, and that at the end, no alternative means of tackling the issue were presented to them. "What happened at the end was that the Prime Minister made decisions about the Turkish flotilla based on this meeting, and based on recommendations by his friends," wrote Lindenstrauss.
The comptroller noted in his report that in the weeks prior to the flotilla, Defense Minister Ehud Barak offered Netanyahu to hold such a meeting on two separate occasions. In addition, Minister Moshe Ya'alon mentioned the issue to Netanyahu three times. In spite of these urgings, Netanyahu's answer was: "yes, yes, we should prepare…" Ya'alon said to the comptroller that "reason holds – I thought – that we should have held a meeting about this issue, and include all government ministers. In retrospect, I can say that the Defense Minister prevented such a meeting from taking place, claiming that it was his jurisdiction."
Speaking with the state comptroller in February 2011, Netanyahu claimed that meetings were actually held, but that these were one-on-one meetings with his Military Secretary, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Defense Minister.
The comptroller wrote in his report that "even though knowledge of the Turkish flotilla existed since early 2010, and even though the Prime Minister recognized that this flotilla was different from previous ones, his decisions were made independently of any official administrative preparation. His decisions were made based on undocumented and impromptu, separate meetings between the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister, and between the PM and Minister of Foreign Affairs. […]. The PM did not head a single meeting, with the participation of relevant ministers, that aimed at preparing a strategy for operational and PR activities to prevent the flotilla from taking place […] and to prepare militarily for the flotilla."
The comptroller added that the meetings between Netanyahu and Barak and Lieberman were conducted privately, without any preparation and without any record. "It isn't clear if and what decision were made in [these meetings], and at any rate there is no documentation," emphasized the comptroller. "Therefore it is not clear how much the ministers who weren't there knew about their options in dealing with the flotilla."
The comptroller further adds that in response to one of the early drafts of the report, Netanyahu claimed that adding more meetings would not have added to his one-on-one briefings with the individual ministers. "I'm interested in the result," said Netanyahu to Lindenstrauss in one of their meetings. "Will the action take place according to how I want it or not… I don't hold meetings for their own sake. I'm the Prime Minister and at the end I have to take everything into consideration and make a decision."
Netanyahu and his staff tried to convince the comptroller that the fact that the political-security cabinet wasn't summoned was a procedural problem, not one of essence. "Taking over the Turkish vessel was a simple military operation, which the army is well-qualified to undertake. No special problem was foreseen, and in these circumstances, there was no justification to bring the issue to the cabinet," the Prime Minister's Office said to Lindenstrauss.
The report adds that finally, five days before the takeover, the "septet" forum of ministers was called in, where it was decided that the flotilla be stopped by force, and all responsibility was transferred to the Defense Minister. The comptroller criticizes harshly what took place in that meeting, concluding that it was summoned hastily, and conducted in an amateur fashion. The Prime Minister's Military Secretary [Maj. Gen.] Yochanan Locker, who called the meeting to find PR ways to deal with the flotilla, finally admitted that "at the end, both PR and Intelligence matters were dealt with together."
The Chief of Staff at the time, [Lt. Gen. (ret.)] Gabi Ashkenazi, said about the meeting that "it could have been handled better." The Head of the Research Department in IDF Intelligence, [Brig. Gen.] Yossi Baidatz , said that "this meeting was called in ad-hoc, and that's why there was no formal preparation for it." Nir Hefetz, the Prime Minister's Spokesman at the time, said that "the meeting was summoned out of the blue ."
Lindenstrauss criticizes that very "septet" meeting, emphasizing that Netanyahu didn't give any time to prepare, and that by that point, some of the Turkish boats had already sailed. "Participants in that meeting were not given advance notice about the purpose of the meeting, and they had no time to prepare," wrote the comptroller.
According to the report, the "septet" ministers received only a very basic briefing about the flotilla, which didn't include any discussion about possible implications, and that at the end, no alternative means of tackling the issue were presented to them. "What happened at the end was that the Prime Minister made decisions about the Turkish flotilla based on this meeting, and based on recommendations by his friends," wrote Lindenstrauss.