How did the question of same-sex ‘marriage’ come before the United States Supreme Court?
Robin Phillips: Two things happened to bring the question of same-sex ‘marriage’ before the Supreme Court. The first is that 83-year-old Edith Windsor of New York was made to pay estate taxes after the death of her same-sex partner, Thea Spyer. Had Thea been Edith’s “wife”, then she could have avoided these taxes. Windsor’s case rests on her claim that the 1996 federal Defense of Marriage Act, which specified that marriage was only between a man and a woman, violates her rights since it means she is allegedly not receiving the same treatment as a married person would.
The second thing that precipitated the court case is that two same-sex couples from California sued former California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger because a 2008 amendment to California’s state Constitution (known as Proposition 8) barred them from getting ‘married.’ Again, the case rests on the idea of equal rights, and equal protection under the law.
What is the Defense of Marriage Act?
RP: The Defence of Marriage Act (or DOMA) was a law passed by Bill Clinton in 1996 to prevent any single state from legalizing same-sex ‘marriage.’ This was on the assumption that a marriage conducted in one state must be recognized by all the other states since marriage is a federally-recognized institution. Clinton wanted to prevent any single state being able to force de facto a new definition of marriage onto the rest. However, nine states have simply ignored DOMA, so that we now have the bizarre situation that a couple can be “married” while in the state of Washington and “not married” as soon as they cross over the border into Idaho.
President Obama has said he does not support DOMA, which is one of the reasons that nine states have felt free to break the law and introduce same-sex ‘marriage.’ As a result, suddenly DOMA seems unconstitutional for denying “legally married couples” benefits such as Social Security and tax deductions. Consequently, DOMA has already been declared unconstitutional in lower courts.
Do these people have a legitimate case before the Supreme Court?
RP: The core argument in both lawsuits hinge on the Constitution’s 14th Amendment. The 14th Amendment was ratified after the War Between the States and specifies that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The question that the Supreme Court must consider is whether California’s Proposition 8 and the Federal Defence of Marriage Act violate the 14th Amendment. This is a constitutional question that ought to be considered on purely legal grounds, though this is not happening because politics and ideology have inevitably got mixed up in it. But theoretically, it ought to simply be a question of what the Constitution means when it grants people equal protection under the law?
My own personal view is that if one assumes that marriage means a union of two persons, then a strong case can be made that both Proposition 8 and DOMA violate the 14th Amendment in the same way that a law prohibiting interracial marriage would violate it. The problem is that the only way one can assert that marriage is a union of persons is to assume in advance a certain verdict of the lawsuit, for as things presently stand in federal law marriage is not a union of persons but a union of a man and a woman. Arguing for a verdict with categories that already presuppose that outcome is called circular reasoning. There are signs that some of the Supreme Court Justices are being persuaded by this fallacious circular reasoning. The debate is also being weighed down by half-baked philosophical and moral arguments that tend to blind people (even really smart Supreme Court Justices) to the real issues at stake.
Could you give us some examples of these ‘half-baked’ arguments?
RP: Well, like the whole equality thing. Once you strip away premises that assume in advance a certain verdict (such as that marriage now means the union of persons), it becomes manifestly false to say that gay ‘marriage’ will make homosexuals and heterosexuals equal with respect to the ability to marry. This is because both groups already have equal access to the institution of marriage, for no one is stopping homosexuals from getting married, since they are allowed to marry someone of the opposite sex. The fact that they do not want to do this is no more relevant to the question than whether the pope wants to marry. Just as it would be absurd to change the definition of marriage to include celibacy so that the Pope can have “equal access” to the institution, so it is absurd to change the definition of marriage so that homosexuals can begin to want access to it.
Another influential argument that seems to be carrying a lot of weight in the court, but which I would also describe as “half-baked” is the idea that marriage can’t be about procreation, even in principle, since then infertile couples would need to be banned from getting married. This argument was considered on Day 1 of the hearing and ever since then various people have come up to me saying things like, “You know Robin, the Supreme Court showed that marriage isn’t about producing babies?” Then they’ll move to the next step and say that since marriage isn’t about babies, biological complementarity is therefore irrelevant.
The reason I said this was a half-baked argument is because it actually rests on what is known as a Fallacy of Composition. This fallacy is committed when a person draws a conclusion about the whole based on characteristics of the parts. It would be like you saying, “some people join the military for reasons that have nothing to do with national defence; therefore, the military as a whole has nothing to do with national defence.”
Just because some couples choose not to have children or are infertile doesn’t negate the fact that the institutional purpose of marriage includes procreation among its ends. Again, what is true of the parts is not always true of the whole. As my friend Perry Robinson recently pointed, if there was no distinction between the purpose of the social institution of marriage and the private intentions of individuals, then the social institution of marriage would never exist in the first place, since the private ends of individuals differ greatly. Theologian Alastair Roberts recently clarified this issue most helpfully in an article ‘The Institution of Marriage, Same-Sex Unions, and Procreation.’ He wrote:
“Marriage integrates various ends, both public and private, into a single institutional form. These ends include, but are not limited to, the fulfilment of our desire for human companionship, sexual intimacy and relations, kinship, and offspring, the securing of the wellbeing of children and the protection and encouragement of their lifelong relationships with their natural parents, the bringing together of the sexes in society, the passing on of a legacy and family line, the creation of extended family bonds, the protection of blood relationships, and the formation of alliances and connections between families.
“While infertile relationships may not fulfil all of these ends, they strengthen the institution by their commitment to it as the fundamental societal form within which we integrate these ends. An infertile couple’s marriage is no less a marriage on account of the fact that it produces no children. If infertile couples were to pursue sexual relations and companionship outside of marriage, it would encourage the dis-integration of the ends of marriage. By entering into marriage they are affirming that these things need to be held together within a single form (much as single people who abstain from sexual relations outside of marriage honour the union and its integrity). They are also declaring that the form of relationship that brings together the two sexes as one, and is the natural context for the conception, bearing, and raising of children should be accorded particular honour, which involves submission to the societal norms that surround it.”
You’ve criticized people who argue for same-sex ‘marriage’ from the starting assumption that marriage is a union of persons. But couldn’t someone object that you are also begging the question by assuming that marriage has to be between a man and a woman?
RP: That would be a legitimate counter-argument if I were assuming that marriage is a union of a man and a woman. But I am not assuming that. The belief that marriage is a union of a man and a woman is a belief I reason to based on the evidence. It is not an assumption that I dogmatically begin with in a way comparable to how the opposition begins by dogmatically assuming that marriage is a union of persons.
So what is some of the evidence for considering marriage to be the union of a man and a woman?
RP: Well, we can do an easy Reductio ad absurdum on the opposite view. Consider what it would mean is marriage actually did mean the union of two consenting adults. There would then be only two options. The first option would be that while marriage hasn’t always been the union of persons, this is what marriage ought to be now. The second option is that marriage always has been the union of two consenting adults.
Now if both these options are problematic—and I will argue that they are—the only option left is to say that marriage is not a union of persons per se, but the union specifically of a man and a woman.
So let me explain why the first option—that while marriage hasn’t always been the union of persons, this is what marriage ought to be now—is so problematic. The problem with saying that marriage ought to mean the union of persons while acknowledging that historically this just hasn’t been the case, is that the whole case for same-sex ‘marriage’ then collapses. This is because 99% of the case for same-sex ‘marriage’ rests on the notion that what is being sought is not a qualitative change to the definition of marriage but simply a quantitative enlargement of the pool of people allowed to marry. But if we acknowledge that up to now the institution of marriage has nevermeant a union of persons, then that is essentially to concede the argument, since it implies that no one has been discriminating against couples of the same sex any more than they have been discriminating against an individual who wishes to “marry” himself or individuals who might wish to include polyandry in the definition of marriage. If up to now marriage has always meant the union of a man and a woman, then while we might be able to speak of a government discriminating against a black man by denying him the right to marry a white woman, it would not be coherent to talk about government discriminating against people wanting to marry someone of the same sex since such a contingency is incoherent according to the terms of the institution itself.
Indeed, if marriage has always been the union of a man and a woman, then saying that this discriminates against same-sex couples would be like saying that a club which has always been for golf discriminates against tennis players. The only way to get around this and to still maintain that marriage has previously referred to a union of a man and a woman would be to simply assert that the definition ought to be changed. That would be like saying that the golf club ought to become a golf-and-tennis-club. But this is not what is being pushed, because if it was, then it would negate the claim that homosexuals have been victims of unequal treatment. In reality they are no more the victims of unequal treatment than tennis players who are told they can only play golf at the golf club.
The other option left is what I mentioned a minute ago, namely that marriage has not previously referred exclusively to the union of a man and a woman, but that it always has been the union of persons. That would be like someone claiming that the golf club had actually always been a golf-and-tennis club. Now suddenly the issue becomes an empirical question that can be verified on historical grounds. Someone taking this position would need to maintain that the gender of the persons has always been accidental in an Aristotelian sense. But notice what follows -- We are then claiming that the union of a man and woman has always been a variant of the union of persons; that biology and the possibility of reproduction were never at the core of what marriage is, but additions to it; that consummation was never central to the completion of a marriage since only practical when the “union of persons” happened to be members of the opposite sex; that “man and wife” were never something that made a relationship a marriage but were always a species of the genus “union of persons.” These are historical claims that we can verify empirically, in the same way as we could verify it if someone claimed the golf club had always been a golf and tennis club.
As we look at the facts, we find that this has never been how the institution was understood, even among cultures like ancient Rome, which might have been most inclined to understand marriage as the union of persons. Given the fact that it was only fifty years ago that marriage stopped being understood in conjugal terms, it simply will not do to say that “man and woman” has always been a subset of “persons.” Ergo, those who take the view that marriage always has been the union of persons are pushed into the corner of having to acknowledge that throughout most of human history, the laws, customs, culture and language built up around marriage was based on a misunderstanding of what marriage actually was, for until recently no one understood that marriage has actually always been the union of persons. That would be about as absurd as saying that everyone in the golf club had really belonged to a golf-and-tennis-club or a golf-and-water-sports club or a golf-and-chess-club without realizing it.
Let’s be clear, the fact that marriage has never been understood as a union of persons does not itself prove the new concept to be faulty. However, at a minimum it does establish that it is a new concept, a novel definition that is discontinuous with the institution of marriage as it has been understood and practice for thousands of years. This is something the champions of gay marriage are reluctant to acknowledge since their case for “equal access” depends on maintaining some degree of continuity with the norms of an existing institution. They want to appropriate these norms to themselves without having the courage to admit that what they are really doing is restructuring, rearranging and changing the essence of the institution itself.
That’s fascinating. Thanks for sharing that. Getting back to the Supreme Court, I wanted to ask if there are already signs which way the court may be leaning?
RP: There are enough liberal Justices on the Supreme Court that many people think DOMA will be overturned, regardless of what they eventually decide to do in the California case. At least, that’s the impression I’m getting from the papers, but most of them are liberal so we will have to wait until late June before we’ll know for sure.
Even if DOMA is overturned, it’s hard to tell how the Court will apply the implementation issues. One option might be that same-sex couples would only enjoy those federal benefits while residing in the states that recognize same-sex ‘marriage’ but not if they cross the border into one of the states that doesn’t recognize it. But that would probably be construed as violating the right of interstate travel. Another option is that all the states would simply have no choice but to recognize same-sex ‘marriage.’ Another option is that the Court will hand down a decision that is sufficiently vague on the particulars so that the White House is forced to step in and clarify things as an administration issue.
What is the worst case scenario?
RP: The worst case scenario is that all the states and the federal government could be forced to recognize same-sex ‘marriages.’ This would affect more than 1,100 federal laws that give benefits to married couples. It would also affect employers, who would then be forced to treat people in a same-sex ‘marriage’ identical to those in a real marriage or else be sued.
The most significant ramifications of the Court opening the door for the federal definition of marriage to be changed would probably be long-term and should be measured in terms of centuries not years. It is simply not possible to foresee all the long-term consequences that could arise from tampering with such an ancient and enduring institution as marriage.
One possible consequence is in the area of paedophilia. A California Bill was recently put forward to prohibit giving a minor therapy to change his or her sexual orientation, even if the minor requests it. Republicans wanted to add an amendment specifying that, “pedophilia is not covered as an orientation” but Democrats defeated the amendment. Rep. Alcee Hastings justified this by saying that all sexual lifestyles should be protected under the Bill.
Let's take the Democrats logic one step further. Once we legalize same-sex ‘marriage’ on the grounds that its prohibition represents discrimination against a certain orientation (namely homosexuality), then it will be hard to argue against those who suggest that we should legalize marriage to children on the grounds of not discrimination against those with the sexual orientation of paedophilia.
Such an argument would be strengthened by the biological determinism that is increasingly coming to characterize debates about paedophilia. An article earlier this year by Alan Zarembo for the Los Angeles Times website noted that “Like many forms of sexual deviance, pedophilia once was thought to stem from psychological influences early in life. Now, many experts view it as a sexual orientation as immutable as heterosexuality or homosexuality. It is a deep-rooted predisposition — limited almost entirely to men — that becomes clear during puberty and does not change.”
Another fairly obvious consequence that we could see quite quickly is an overhaul to the prohibited degrees of kinship based on consanguinity and affinity. These laws were originally based on the idea on the notion, not simply that marriage is a union between a man and a woman, but that it is a specifically sexual union publically recognized because of its potential fecundity. This idea was eroded long before same-sex ‘marriage’ came on the scene thanks to the contraception mentality. As a result, the purpose of marriage gradually shifted to little more than a romantic relationship pursued for individual fulfilment among two consenting adults. If same-sex ‘marriage’ is legalized, this will be the nail in the coffin of the idea that marriage has any natural organic relationship to procreation.
But how would that affect the prohibited degrees of kinship specifically?
RP: Well, think about it. If the institution of marriage is not at least about procreation (whatever else it may be about), then why should a man be prohibited from marrying his sister? Or why should a man be excluded from ‘marrying’ his brother (if he is a homosexual), or his son’s daughter (if he is heterosexual), or his husband’s daughter’s daughter (if he is bisexual)?
Incest produces genetically unhealthy children, but Tauriq Moosa at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, has already pointed out that because of contraception this shouldn’t concern us anymore. He writes:
“people claim that incest creates ‘deformed’ children…..this assumes sex acts are solely for having children, whereas this is nonsense, since we have effective contraceptives and other measures to prevent pregnancy. …why should the sexual activities of two consenting adults concern us? This is the same question we can ask those who are ‘against’ homosexuality (which is like being against having blue eyes). It is none of our business what two consenting adults wish to do (as long as no one else is harmed/involved without consent).”
Then there’s the equality angle to the whole thing. Certain adjustments to the rules about consanguinity and affinity will probably seem reasonable within a same-sex context since members of the same sex can’t produce children together. So even if you could justify a prohibition on a woman marrying her brother, this wouldn’t apply if the same woman wanted to “marry” her sister. However, once those adjustments are introduced, you would either need a two-tier system, which shows that same-sex ‘marriage’ really is qualitatively different, or else those same adjustments would have to be mapped over onto the laws regulating real marriages. After all, are we going to say that a homosexual man can marry his brother’s son but deny a heterosexual man the privilege of marrying his brother’s daughter? Are we going to allow a lesbian to ‘marry’ her ‘wife’s’ sister’s daughter but deny a heterosexual woman the right to marry her husband’s sister’s son? These are the difficult questions that few people are asking.
Then there’s the constitutional angle, which parallels issues that arose last year in the debates surrounding the constitutionality of Obamacare. The four liberal Supreme Court justices claimed that the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act should be upheld as part of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce delegated to it in the Constitution. Critics pointed out that if the federal government could force people to buy health insurance as part of commerce regulation, then in principle it might also be able to force people to buy vegetables or certain cars as part of this same authority. In a similar way, it needs to now be pointed out that if the 14th Amendment really does allow the federal government authority to force states to recognize same-sex unions in the legal definition of marriage, then in principle the constitution also allows the federal government authority to force states to accept many other unions as legal marriage, including those currently prohibited by the laws of consanguinity and affinity.
In your writings you point out that legalizing same-sex ‘marriage’ won’t just affect homosexuals, but everyone?
RP: Yes, and this is something I came to understand from reading Douglas Farrow’s accounts of what happened in Canada after same-sex ‘marriage’ was legalized there.
A state which legalizes gay marriage is a state that has assumed the god-like power to declare which collections of individuals constitute a ‘family.’ But by this assumption government implies that both marriage and family are little more than legal constructs at best, and gifts from the state at worst. In the former case, marriage and family lose their objective fixity; in the latter case, we become wards of the state.
Without the intervention of government, there is no pre-political, real-world state of affairs that mark certain types of same-sex relationships out as being marital within a state of nature. Unlike heterosexual marriage, which exists in nature and is then recognized by the state on the basis of intrinsic goods attached to it, homosexual marriage is an abstract legal entity with no natural or existential existence. Since neither consummation nor biologically-derived intrinsic goods are viable concepts among same-sex couples, it follows that the only way a consensual relationship between two people of the same sex can be upgraded into marriage is if the state steps in and declares that relationship to be a marriage, in much the same way as the state might declare something to be a corporation or some other legal entity.
But here’s the rub: once we concede that same-sex ‘marriage’ is purely the creation of positive law, then for these ‘marriages’ to be truly equal to heterosexual ones, we would have to acknowledge that EVERY marriage and family are simply creations of the state. This concedes to the state the power to determine what collections of individuals are a marriage or a family, rather than acknowledging that the state merely recognizes a reality that precedes and exceeds itself.
This shift is apparent in Canada after they legalized same-sex ‘marriage’, as Canadian theologian Douglas Farrow has shown. “Six years ago, when same-sex marriage became law in Canada, the new legislation quietly acknowledged this [that family is nothing more than a legal construct]. In its consequential amendments section, Bill C-38 struck out the language of ‘natural parent,’ ‘blood relationship,’ etc., from all Canadian laws. Wherever they were found, these expressions were replaced with ‘legal parent,’ ‘legal relationship,’ and so forth. That was strictly necessary. ‘Marriage’ was now a legal fiction, a tool of the state, not a natural and pre-political institution recognized and in certain respects (age, consanguinity, consent, exclusivity) regulated by the state.”
You mentioned that intrinsic goods are attached to real marriages. What are your referring to specifically?
RP: The institution of marriage has the potential to provide children, and it is the institution which offers children the best chance of being raised by their biological parents. This is an intrinsic good both for the children, for society for the state. The reason it is an intrinsic good for the state is that it leads to future citizens, tax payers, soldiers, laborers and such. The state therefore has a legitimate interest in promoting stable family relations between a husband and wife, because such unions in general will promote procreation and stable family relations. You can read more about this in Girgis Anderson and George’s book, What is Marriage?
What does this debate reveal about America today?
RP: That’s a good question.
I don’t watch the news very much, partly because we don’t have a television. But when I do catch a news report, this issue is almost inevitably being framed in generational terms. The subtext is that it is the old people who are clinging to outdated ideas while the young people have learned to adjust to life in the 21st century. Consequently, most young people don’t really know what all the fuss is about when it comes to “letting homosexuals get married.”
Now the generational gap isn’t quite as stark as the media is trying to portray. If it were then 41 states wouldn’t have been able to pass laws defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman! But still, there is some truth to it. It’s interesting for me because I’ve written about normalization theory and it seems that for the younger generation gay ‘marriage’ just seems normal. More than that, supporting gay ‘marriage’ seems like the progressive, trendy, modern and cool thing to do. You get some idea of this by the way the media makes heroes out of any public figure that “come out” in support of gay marriage. This is reversing the field of play that used to be at work: vice used to have the exhilaration of going against the grain, but now it is those who contend for virtue that find themselves being marginalized against the forces of prejudice and suspicion. I believe this will become more apparent in the days ahead, and it brings to mind G.K. Chesterton’s words, “The act of defending any of the cardinal virtues has today all the exhilaration of a vice.”
Something else this whole debate has revealed to me about America is that everyone seems to be trapped within their own interpretive communities, unable to have constructive dialogue with those in different communities. The two sides seem to be separated by a chasm of mutual incomprehensibility that short-circuits genuine discussion. Social critics have been commented on this for a while, but now it seems to have reached a pitch.
We see this in the way that so many people—on both sides of the debate—have been unable to transcend beyond simple sloganeering and unsophisticated argumentation, and this even includes people with legal training. As I shared earlier, so much of the case for same-sex ‘marriage’ rests on premises that already implicitly assume the conclusion and so are viciously circular. The result is that we do not really have dialogue at all, but simply cycles of assertions, denunciations and reassertions. As a result, each side is often unable to really address the concerns of the other side in a way that is satisfying and shows they are really listening.
This is constantly a source of frustration to me. Again and again I find that no matter how carefully I frame my arguments so they can be meaningful to those on the other side, my opponents will keep coming back at me with a retort like, “You’re just saying that because you believe the Bible” or “it’s clear the bottom line is that you just hate homosexuals.” It’s like the opposite side wants me to be arguing from the standpoint of a narrow-minded fundamentalist because they have the categories for dealing with that, but when I appeal to tightly reasoned arguments that are not explicitly religious, they don’t know how to deal with that so they resort to ridicule and insults.
I don’t want to make the same mistake, and so I always try to make sure I can summarize my opponents’ case in a way that they can say, “Yes, that’s what I’m trying to say. Robin understands where I’m coming from even if he doesn’t agree.” Then, when I present my case, I try to emphasize the things I agree about. For example, I will acknowledge that the push to legalize it has brought some important truths to the public consciousness, such as the importance of equal protection under the law, the understanding that marriage has never been a static concept, and the limitations involved in trying to impose a religiously-derived concept onto a pluralistic society. I can even share that of all the arguments that can be made in support of gay marriage, it is the last that I find the most compelling. You see, as a Christian I recognize the problem in trying to impose the teachings of my religion onto those who have different perspectives and lifestyles. This isn’t because I think the state can be religiously neutral, for I would follow William Cavanaugh and other thinkers in denying that the concept of religious neutrality is even coherent. However, even in a society governed by the teachings of the Bible, there is an important distinction between a sin and a crime, or between what is morally ideal and what is legally permissible. So it isn’t a matter of just saying, “This is what the Bible says, therefore gay marriage is bad.” It’s a matter of looking at the common good, considering how same-sex ‘marriage’ will affect everyone, carefully thinking through the legal ramifications, and so forth.
I find that if I lay things out like this, it breaks down some of the hostility. One person commented on one of my articles saying, “After reading it I can sort of understand where the 'other side of the argument' is coming from.” He still disagreed, but at least he was starting to understand the case that could be made against same-sex ‘marriage.’ I hope to have the opportunity to see more of that sort of thing in the days ahead, but I often get discouraged because of the abuse that is thrown at me by the other side.
I know you’ve been quite involved in campaigning for real marriage. If someone wants to read some of your writings on this subject, do you have any resources you would recommend?
RP: Yes. I would recommend the article I wrote for Salvo ‘5 Gay Marriage Myths’ in which I tried to clear away some of the erroneous ideas that tend to stand in the way of fruitful public debate on this topic.
I would recommend my Salvo Magazine article ‘Apples, Oranges & Gay Marriage’ because I address some of the hidden assumptions that are operative in this debate in the way key terms are being defined and accepted without question.
I really believe that an underlying issue in this whole debate is the question of gender complementarity. Behind the idea of same-sex ‘marriage’ is the idea that our gender is irrelevant, like the color of our eyes. I have written about this my articles ‘The Gender Wars’ and Unmaking a Difference: Is Gender Neutrality the New Stereotype? and ‘Gender Benders.’
I’ve also done some work trying to explore some of the plausibility structures that have led, sociologically speaking, to the state of affairs we find ourselves in today, and this is a field I hope to dabble some more in in the days to come. Some of my articles about this are ‘How Gay Marriage Became Plausible’ and ‘Industrialization and Marriage’ and ‘Marriage is Bigger than the Couple.’ Related to this, I’ve also done some work on how perversions become normalized on an unconscious level so we stop questioning things that at one time might have seemed strange. This is something I address in ‘Sex & the Kiddies’ and ‘The Neuro Transformers’ and ‘Normalcy Fields and Homosexual Acceptance.’
Finally, my book Saints and Scoundrels has a chapter on the Frankfurt Movement, which gives some of the background behind the ideology appropriated by the gay rights’ movement. Some of this same material is also in my Salvo article ‘The Illusionist How Herbert Marcuse Convinced a Generation that Censorship Is Tolerance & Other Politically Correct Tricks.’
Actually, the best resources in the same-sex ‘marriage’ debate are not written by me but by Canadian theologian Douglas Farrow. Farrow has very helpfully shown how once same-sex ‘marriage’ was legalized in Canada, it changed EVERY marriage in the land, even those among heterosexuals. You can read about this in Farrow’s Touchstone article, ‘Why Fight Same-Sex Marriage?’ and his little book Nation of Bastards: Essays on the end of marriage.
Robin Phillips is a contributing editor for Salvo Magazine and the author of Saints and Scoundrels. He is a doctoral student in historical theology at King’s College, London and has a regular column at the Chuck Colson Center. He operates a blog at RobinPhillips.blogspot.com.
Robin Phillips: Two things happened to bring the question of same-sex ‘marriage’ before the Supreme Court. The first is that 83-year-old Edith Windsor of New York was made to pay estate taxes after the death of her same-sex partner, Thea Spyer. Had Thea been Edith’s “wife”, then she could have avoided these taxes. Windsor’s case rests on her claim that the 1996 federal Defense of Marriage Act, which specified that marriage was only between a man and a woman, violates her rights since it means she is allegedly not receiving the same treatment as a married person would.
The second thing that precipitated the court case is that two same-sex couples from California sued former California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger because a 2008 amendment to California’s state Constitution (known as Proposition 8) barred them from getting ‘married.’ Again, the case rests on the idea of equal rights, and equal protection under the law.
What is the Defense of Marriage Act?
RP: The Defence of Marriage Act (or DOMA) was a law passed by Bill Clinton in 1996 to prevent any single state from legalizing same-sex ‘marriage.’ This was on the assumption that a marriage conducted in one state must be recognized by all the other states since marriage is a federally-recognized institution. Clinton wanted to prevent any single state being able to force de facto a new definition of marriage onto the rest. However, nine states have simply ignored DOMA, so that we now have the bizarre situation that a couple can be “married” while in the state of Washington and “not married” as soon as they cross over the border into Idaho.
President Obama has said he does not support DOMA, which is one of the reasons that nine states have felt free to break the law and introduce same-sex ‘marriage.’ As a result, suddenly DOMA seems unconstitutional for denying “legally married couples” benefits such as Social Security and tax deductions. Consequently, DOMA has already been declared unconstitutional in lower courts.
Do these people have a legitimate case before the Supreme Court?
RP: The core argument in both lawsuits hinge on the Constitution’s 14th Amendment. The 14th Amendment was ratified after the War Between the States and specifies that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The question that the Supreme Court must consider is whether California’s Proposition 8 and the Federal Defence of Marriage Act violate the 14th Amendment. This is a constitutional question that ought to be considered on purely legal grounds, though this is not happening because politics and ideology have inevitably got mixed up in it. But theoretically, it ought to simply be a question of what the Constitution means when it grants people equal protection under the law?
My own personal view is that if one assumes that marriage means a union of two persons, then a strong case can be made that both Proposition 8 and DOMA violate the 14th Amendment in the same way that a law prohibiting interracial marriage would violate it. The problem is that the only way one can assert that marriage is a union of persons is to assume in advance a certain verdict of the lawsuit, for as things presently stand in federal law marriage is not a union of persons but a union of a man and a woman. Arguing for a verdict with categories that already presuppose that outcome is called circular reasoning. There are signs that some of the Supreme Court Justices are being persuaded by this fallacious circular reasoning. The debate is also being weighed down by half-baked philosophical and moral arguments that tend to blind people (even really smart Supreme Court Justices) to the real issues at stake.
Could you give us some examples of these ‘half-baked’ arguments?
RP: Well, like the whole equality thing. Once you strip away premises that assume in advance a certain verdict (such as that marriage now means the union of persons), it becomes manifestly false to say that gay ‘marriage’ will make homosexuals and heterosexuals equal with respect to the ability to marry. This is because both groups already have equal access to the institution of marriage, for no one is stopping homosexuals from getting married, since they are allowed to marry someone of the opposite sex. The fact that they do not want to do this is no more relevant to the question than whether the pope wants to marry. Just as it would be absurd to change the definition of marriage to include celibacy so that the Pope can have “equal access” to the institution, so it is absurd to change the definition of marriage so that homosexuals can begin to want access to it.
Another influential argument that seems to be carrying a lot of weight in the court, but which I would also describe as “half-baked” is the idea that marriage can’t be about procreation, even in principle, since then infertile couples would need to be banned from getting married. This argument was considered on Day 1 of the hearing and ever since then various people have come up to me saying things like, “You know Robin, the Supreme Court showed that marriage isn’t about producing babies?” Then they’ll move to the next step and say that since marriage isn’t about babies, biological complementarity is therefore irrelevant.
The reason I said this was a half-baked argument is because it actually rests on what is known as a Fallacy of Composition. This fallacy is committed when a person draws a conclusion about the whole based on characteristics of the parts. It would be like you saying, “some people join the military for reasons that have nothing to do with national defence; therefore, the military as a whole has nothing to do with national defence.”
Just because some couples choose not to have children or are infertile doesn’t negate the fact that the institutional purpose of marriage includes procreation among its ends. Again, what is true of the parts is not always true of the whole. As my friend Perry Robinson recently pointed, if there was no distinction between the purpose of the social institution of marriage and the private intentions of individuals, then the social institution of marriage would never exist in the first place, since the private ends of individuals differ greatly. Theologian Alastair Roberts recently clarified this issue most helpfully in an article ‘The Institution of Marriage, Same-Sex Unions, and Procreation.’ He wrote:
“Marriage integrates various ends, both public and private, into a single institutional form. These ends include, but are not limited to, the fulfilment of our desire for human companionship, sexual intimacy and relations, kinship, and offspring, the securing of the wellbeing of children and the protection and encouragement of their lifelong relationships with their natural parents, the bringing together of the sexes in society, the passing on of a legacy and family line, the creation of extended family bonds, the protection of blood relationships, and the formation of alliances and connections between families.
“While infertile relationships may not fulfil all of these ends, they strengthen the institution by their commitment to it as the fundamental societal form within which we integrate these ends. An infertile couple’s marriage is no less a marriage on account of the fact that it produces no children. If infertile couples were to pursue sexual relations and companionship outside of marriage, it would encourage the dis-integration of the ends of marriage. By entering into marriage they are affirming that these things need to be held together within a single form (much as single people who abstain from sexual relations outside of marriage honour the union and its integrity). They are also declaring that the form of relationship that brings together the two sexes as one, and is the natural context for the conception, bearing, and raising of children should be accorded particular honour, which involves submission to the societal norms that surround it.”
You’ve criticized people who argue for same-sex ‘marriage’ from the starting assumption that marriage is a union of persons. But couldn’t someone object that you are also begging the question by assuming that marriage has to be between a man and a woman?
RP: That would be a legitimate counter-argument if I were assuming that marriage is a union of a man and a woman. But I am not assuming that. The belief that marriage is a union of a man and a woman is a belief I reason to based on the evidence. It is not an assumption that I dogmatically begin with in a way comparable to how the opposition begins by dogmatically assuming that marriage is a union of persons.
So what is some of the evidence for considering marriage to be the union of a man and a woman?
RP: Well, we can do an easy Reductio ad absurdum on the opposite view. Consider what it would mean is marriage actually did mean the union of two consenting adults. There would then be only two options. The first option would be that while marriage hasn’t always been the union of persons, this is what marriage ought to be now. The second option is that marriage always has been the union of two consenting adults.
Now if both these options are problematic—and I will argue that they are—the only option left is to say that marriage is not a union of persons per se, but the union specifically of a man and a woman.
So let me explain why the first option—that while marriage hasn’t always been the union of persons, this is what marriage ought to be now—is so problematic. The problem with saying that marriage ought to mean the union of persons while acknowledging that historically this just hasn’t been the case, is that the whole case for same-sex ‘marriage’ then collapses. This is because 99% of the case for same-sex ‘marriage’ rests on the notion that what is being sought is not a qualitative change to the definition of marriage but simply a quantitative enlargement of the pool of people allowed to marry. But if we acknowledge that up to now the institution of marriage has nevermeant a union of persons, then that is essentially to concede the argument, since it implies that no one has been discriminating against couples of the same sex any more than they have been discriminating against an individual who wishes to “marry” himself or individuals who might wish to include polyandry in the definition of marriage. If up to now marriage has always meant the union of a man and a woman, then while we might be able to speak of a government discriminating against a black man by denying him the right to marry a white woman, it would not be coherent to talk about government discriminating against people wanting to marry someone of the same sex since such a contingency is incoherent according to the terms of the institution itself.
Indeed, if marriage has always been the union of a man and a woman, then saying that this discriminates against same-sex couples would be like saying that a club which has always been for golf discriminates against tennis players. The only way to get around this and to still maintain that marriage has previously referred to a union of a man and a woman would be to simply assert that the definition ought to be changed. That would be like saying that the golf club ought to become a golf-and-tennis-club. But this is not what is being pushed, because if it was, then it would negate the claim that homosexuals have been victims of unequal treatment. In reality they are no more the victims of unequal treatment than tennis players who are told they can only play golf at the golf club.
The other option left is what I mentioned a minute ago, namely that marriage has not previously referred exclusively to the union of a man and a woman, but that it always has been the union of persons. That would be like someone claiming that the golf club had actually always been a golf-and-tennis club. Now suddenly the issue becomes an empirical question that can be verified on historical grounds. Someone taking this position would need to maintain that the gender of the persons has always been accidental in an Aristotelian sense. But notice what follows -- We are then claiming that the union of a man and woman has always been a variant of the union of persons; that biology and the possibility of reproduction were never at the core of what marriage is, but additions to it; that consummation was never central to the completion of a marriage since only practical when the “union of persons” happened to be members of the opposite sex; that “man and wife” were never something that made a relationship a marriage but were always a species of the genus “union of persons.” These are historical claims that we can verify empirically, in the same way as we could verify it if someone claimed the golf club had always been a golf and tennis club.
As we look at the facts, we find that this has never been how the institution was understood, even among cultures like ancient Rome, which might have been most inclined to understand marriage as the union of persons. Given the fact that it was only fifty years ago that marriage stopped being understood in conjugal terms, it simply will not do to say that “man and woman” has always been a subset of “persons.” Ergo, those who take the view that marriage always has been the union of persons are pushed into the corner of having to acknowledge that throughout most of human history, the laws, customs, culture and language built up around marriage was based on a misunderstanding of what marriage actually was, for until recently no one understood that marriage has actually always been the union of persons. That would be about as absurd as saying that everyone in the golf club had really belonged to a golf-and-tennis-club or a golf-and-water-sports club or a golf-and-chess-club without realizing it.
Let’s be clear, the fact that marriage has never been understood as a union of persons does not itself prove the new concept to be faulty. However, at a minimum it does establish that it is a new concept, a novel definition that is discontinuous with the institution of marriage as it has been understood and practice for thousands of years. This is something the champions of gay marriage are reluctant to acknowledge since their case for “equal access” depends on maintaining some degree of continuity with the norms of an existing institution. They want to appropriate these norms to themselves without having the courage to admit that what they are really doing is restructuring, rearranging and changing the essence of the institution itself.
That’s fascinating. Thanks for sharing that. Getting back to the Supreme Court, I wanted to ask if there are already signs which way the court may be leaning?
RP: There are enough liberal Justices on the Supreme Court that many people think DOMA will be overturned, regardless of what they eventually decide to do in the California case. At least, that’s the impression I’m getting from the papers, but most of them are liberal so we will have to wait until late June before we’ll know for sure.
Even if DOMA is overturned, it’s hard to tell how the Court will apply the implementation issues. One option might be that same-sex couples would only enjoy those federal benefits while residing in the states that recognize same-sex ‘marriage’ but not if they cross the border into one of the states that doesn’t recognize it. But that would probably be construed as violating the right of interstate travel. Another option is that all the states would simply have no choice but to recognize same-sex ‘marriage.’ Another option is that the Court will hand down a decision that is sufficiently vague on the particulars so that the White House is forced to step in and clarify things as an administration issue.
What is the worst case scenario?
RP: The worst case scenario is that all the states and the federal government could be forced to recognize same-sex ‘marriages.’ This would affect more than 1,100 federal laws that give benefits to married couples. It would also affect employers, who would then be forced to treat people in a same-sex ‘marriage’ identical to those in a real marriage or else be sued.
The most significant ramifications of the Court opening the door for the federal definition of marriage to be changed would probably be long-term and should be measured in terms of centuries not years. It is simply not possible to foresee all the long-term consequences that could arise from tampering with such an ancient and enduring institution as marriage.
One possible consequence is in the area of paedophilia. A California Bill was recently put forward to prohibit giving a minor therapy to change his or her sexual orientation, even if the minor requests it. Republicans wanted to add an amendment specifying that, “pedophilia is not covered as an orientation” but Democrats defeated the amendment. Rep. Alcee Hastings justified this by saying that all sexual lifestyles should be protected under the Bill.
Let's take the Democrats logic one step further. Once we legalize same-sex ‘marriage’ on the grounds that its prohibition represents discrimination against a certain orientation (namely homosexuality), then it will be hard to argue against those who suggest that we should legalize marriage to children on the grounds of not discrimination against those with the sexual orientation of paedophilia.
Such an argument would be strengthened by the biological determinism that is increasingly coming to characterize debates about paedophilia. An article earlier this year by Alan Zarembo for the Los Angeles Times website noted that “Like many forms of sexual deviance, pedophilia once was thought to stem from psychological influences early in life. Now, many experts view it as a sexual orientation as immutable as heterosexuality or homosexuality. It is a deep-rooted predisposition — limited almost entirely to men — that becomes clear during puberty and does not change.”
Another fairly obvious consequence that we could see quite quickly is an overhaul to the prohibited degrees of kinship based on consanguinity and affinity. These laws were originally based on the idea on the notion, not simply that marriage is a union between a man and a woman, but that it is a specifically sexual union publically recognized because of its potential fecundity. This idea was eroded long before same-sex ‘marriage’ came on the scene thanks to the contraception mentality. As a result, the purpose of marriage gradually shifted to little more than a romantic relationship pursued for individual fulfilment among two consenting adults. If same-sex ‘marriage’ is legalized, this will be the nail in the coffin of the idea that marriage has any natural organic relationship to procreation.
But how would that affect the prohibited degrees of kinship specifically?
RP: Well, think about it. If the institution of marriage is not at least about procreation (whatever else it may be about), then why should a man be prohibited from marrying his sister? Or why should a man be excluded from ‘marrying’ his brother (if he is a homosexual), or his son’s daughter (if he is heterosexual), or his husband’s daughter’s daughter (if he is bisexual)?
Incest produces genetically unhealthy children, but Tauriq Moosa at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, has already pointed out that because of contraception this shouldn’t concern us anymore. He writes:
“people claim that incest creates ‘deformed’ children…..this assumes sex acts are solely for having children, whereas this is nonsense, since we have effective contraceptives and other measures to prevent pregnancy. …why should the sexual activities of two consenting adults concern us? This is the same question we can ask those who are ‘against’ homosexuality (which is like being against having blue eyes). It is none of our business what two consenting adults wish to do (as long as no one else is harmed/involved without consent).”
Then there’s the equality angle to the whole thing. Certain adjustments to the rules about consanguinity and affinity will probably seem reasonable within a same-sex context since members of the same sex can’t produce children together. So even if you could justify a prohibition on a woman marrying her brother, this wouldn’t apply if the same woman wanted to “marry” her sister. However, once those adjustments are introduced, you would either need a two-tier system, which shows that same-sex ‘marriage’ really is qualitatively different, or else those same adjustments would have to be mapped over onto the laws regulating real marriages. After all, are we going to say that a homosexual man can marry his brother’s son but deny a heterosexual man the privilege of marrying his brother’s daughter? Are we going to allow a lesbian to ‘marry’ her ‘wife’s’ sister’s daughter but deny a heterosexual woman the right to marry her husband’s sister’s son? These are the difficult questions that few people are asking.
Then there’s the constitutional angle, which parallels issues that arose last year in the debates surrounding the constitutionality of Obamacare. The four liberal Supreme Court justices claimed that the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act should be upheld as part of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce delegated to it in the Constitution. Critics pointed out that if the federal government could force people to buy health insurance as part of commerce regulation, then in principle it might also be able to force people to buy vegetables or certain cars as part of this same authority. In a similar way, it needs to now be pointed out that if the 14th Amendment really does allow the federal government authority to force states to recognize same-sex unions in the legal definition of marriage, then in principle the constitution also allows the federal government authority to force states to accept many other unions as legal marriage, including those currently prohibited by the laws of consanguinity and affinity.
In your writings you point out that legalizing same-sex ‘marriage’ won’t just affect homosexuals, but everyone?
RP: Yes, and this is something I came to understand from reading Douglas Farrow’s accounts of what happened in Canada after same-sex ‘marriage’ was legalized there.
A state which legalizes gay marriage is a state that has assumed the god-like power to declare which collections of individuals constitute a ‘family.’ But by this assumption government implies that both marriage and family are little more than legal constructs at best, and gifts from the state at worst. In the former case, marriage and family lose their objective fixity; in the latter case, we become wards of the state.
Without the intervention of government, there is no pre-political, real-world state of affairs that mark certain types of same-sex relationships out as being marital within a state of nature. Unlike heterosexual marriage, which exists in nature and is then recognized by the state on the basis of intrinsic goods attached to it, homosexual marriage is an abstract legal entity with no natural or existential existence. Since neither consummation nor biologically-derived intrinsic goods are viable concepts among same-sex couples, it follows that the only way a consensual relationship between two people of the same sex can be upgraded into marriage is if the state steps in and declares that relationship to be a marriage, in much the same way as the state might declare something to be a corporation or some other legal entity.
But here’s the rub: once we concede that same-sex ‘marriage’ is purely the creation of positive law, then for these ‘marriages’ to be truly equal to heterosexual ones, we would have to acknowledge that EVERY marriage and family are simply creations of the state. This concedes to the state the power to determine what collections of individuals are a marriage or a family, rather than acknowledging that the state merely recognizes a reality that precedes and exceeds itself.
This shift is apparent in Canada after they legalized same-sex ‘marriage’, as Canadian theologian Douglas Farrow has shown. “Six years ago, when same-sex marriage became law in Canada, the new legislation quietly acknowledged this [that family is nothing more than a legal construct]. In its consequential amendments section, Bill C-38 struck out the language of ‘natural parent,’ ‘blood relationship,’ etc., from all Canadian laws. Wherever they were found, these expressions were replaced with ‘legal parent,’ ‘legal relationship,’ and so forth. That was strictly necessary. ‘Marriage’ was now a legal fiction, a tool of the state, not a natural and pre-political institution recognized and in certain respects (age, consanguinity, consent, exclusivity) regulated by the state.”
You mentioned that intrinsic goods are attached to real marriages. What are your referring to specifically?
RP: The institution of marriage has the potential to provide children, and it is the institution which offers children the best chance of being raised by their biological parents. This is an intrinsic good both for the children, for society for the state. The reason it is an intrinsic good for the state is that it leads to future citizens, tax payers, soldiers, laborers and such. The state therefore has a legitimate interest in promoting stable family relations between a husband and wife, because such unions in general will promote procreation and stable family relations. You can read more about this in Girgis Anderson and George’s book, What is Marriage?
What does this debate reveal about America today?
RP: That’s a good question.
I don’t watch the news very much, partly because we don’t have a television. But when I do catch a news report, this issue is almost inevitably being framed in generational terms. The subtext is that it is the old people who are clinging to outdated ideas while the young people have learned to adjust to life in the 21st century. Consequently, most young people don’t really know what all the fuss is about when it comes to “letting homosexuals get married.”
Now the generational gap isn’t quite as stark as the media is trying to portray. If it were then 41 states wouldn’t have been able to pass laws defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman! But still, there is some truth to it. It’s interesting for me because I’ve written about normalization theory and it seems that for the younger generation gay ‘marriage’ just seems normal. More than that, supporting gay ‘marriage’ seems like the progressive, trendy, modern and cool thing to do. You get some idea of this by the way the media makes heroes out of any public figure that “come out” in support of gay marriage. This is reversing the field of play that used to be at work: vice used to have the exhilaration of going against the grain, but now it is those who contend for virtue that find themselves being marginalized against the forces of prejudice and suspicion. I believe this will become more apparent in the days ahead, and it brings to mind G.K. Chesterton’s words, “The act of defending any of the cardinal virtues has today all the exhilaration of a vice.”
Something else this whole debate has revealed to me about America is that everyone seems to be trapped within their own interpretive communities, unable to have constructive dialogue with those in different communities. The two sides seem to be separated by a chasm of mutual incomprehensibility that short-circuits genuine discussion. Social critics have been commented on this for a while, but now it seems to have reached a pitch.
We see this in the way that so many people—on both sides of the debate—have been unable to transcend beyond simple sloganeering and unsophisticated argumentation, and this even includes people with legal training. As I shared earlier, so much of the case for same-sex ‘marriage’ rests on premises that already implicitly assume the conclusion and so are viciously circular. The result is that we do not really have dialogue at all, but simply cycles of assertions, denunciations and reassertions. As a result, each side is often unable to really address the concerns of the other side in a way that is satisfying and shows they are really listening.
This is constantly a source of frustration to me. Again and again I find that no matter how carefully I frame my arguments so they can be meaningful to those on the other side, my opponents will keep coming back at me with a retort like, “You’re just saying that because you believe the Bible” or “it’s clear the bottom line is that you just hate homosexuals.” It’s like the opposite side wants me to be arguing from the standpoint of a narrow-minded fundamentalist because they have the categories for dealing with that, but when I appeal to tightly reasoned arguments that are not explicitly religious, they don’t know how to deal with that so they resort to ridicule and insults.
I don’t want to make the same mistake, and so I always try to make sure I can summarize my opponents’ case in a way that they can say, “Yes, that’s what I’m trying to say. Robin understands where I’m coming from even if he doesn’t agree.” Then, when I present my case, I try to emphasize the things I agree about. For example, I will acknowledge that the push to legalize it has brought some important truths to the public consciousness, such as the importance of equal protection under the law, the understanding that marriage has never been a static concept, and the limitations involved in trying to impose a religiously-derived concept onto a pluralistic society. I can even share that of all the arguments that can be made in support of gay marriage, it is the last that I find the most compelling. You see, as a Christian I recognize the problem in trying to impose the teachings of my religion onto those who have different perspectives and lifestyles. This isn’t because I think the state can be religiously neutral, for I would follow William Cavanaugh and other thinkers in denying that the concept of religious neutrality is even coherent. However, even in a society governed by the teachings of the Bible, there is an important distinction between a sin and a crime, or between what is morally ideal and what is legally permissible. So it isn’t a matter of just saying, “This is what the Bible says, therefore gay marriage is bad.” It’s a matter of looking at the common good, considering how same-sex ‘marriage’ will affect everyone, carefully thinking through the legal ramifications, and so forth.
I find that if I lay things out like this, it breaks down some of the hostility. One person commented on one of my articles saying, “After reading it I can sort of understand where the 'other side of the argument' is coming from.” He still disagreed, but at least he was starting to understand the case that could be made against same-sex ‘marriage.’ I hope to have the opportunity to see more of that sort of thing in the days ahead, but I often get discouraged because of the abuse that is thrown at me by the other side.
I know you’ve been quite involved in campaigning for real marriage. If someone wants to read some of your writings on this subject, do you have any resources you would recommend?
RP: Yes. I would recommend the article I wrote for Salvo ‘5 Gay Marriage Myths’ in which I tried to clear away some of the erroneous ideas that tend to stand in the way of fruitful public debate on this topic.
I would recommend my Salvo Magazine article ‘Apples, Oranges & Gay Marriage’ because I address some of the hidden assumptions that are operative in this debate in the way key terms are being defined and accepted without question.
I really believe that an underlying issue in this whole debate is the question of gender complementarity. Behind the idea of same-sex ‘marriage’ is the idea that our gender is irrelevant, like the color of our eyes. I have written about this my articles ‘The Gender Wars’ and Unmaking a Difference: Is Gender Neutrality the New Stereotype? and ‘Gender Benders.’
I’ve also done some work trying to explore some of the plausibility structures that have led, sociologically speaking, to the state of affairs we find ourselves in today, and this is a field I hope to dabble some more in in the days to come. Some of my articles about this are ‘How Gay Marriage Became Plausible’ and ‘Industrialization and Marriage’ and ‘Marriage is Bigger than the Couple.’ Related to this, I’ve also done some work on how perversions become normalized on an unconscious level so we stop questioning things that at one time might have seemed strange. This is something I address in ‘Sex & the Kiddies’ and ‘The Neuro Transformers’ and ‘Normalcy Fields and Homosexual Acceptance.’
Finally, my book Saints and Scoundrels has a chapter on the Frankfurt Movement, which gives some of the background behind the ideology appropriated by the gay rights’ movement. Some of this same material is also in my Salvo article ‘The Illusionist How Herbert Marcuse Convinced a Generation that Censorship Is Tolerance & Other Politically Correct Tricks.’
Actually, the best resources in the same-sex ‘marriage’ debate are not written by me but by Canadian theologian Douglas Farrow. Farrow has very helpfully shown how once same-sex ‘marriage’ was legalized in Canada, it changed EVERY marriage in the land, even those among heterosexuals. You can read about this in Farrow’s Touchstone article, ‘Why Fight Same-Sex Marriage?’ and his little book Nation of Bastards: Essays on the end of marriage.
Robin Phillips is a contributing editor for Salvo Magazine and the author of Saints and Scoundrels. He is a doctoral student in historical theology at King’s College, London and has a regular column at the Chuck Colson Center. He operates a blog at RobinPhillips.blogspot.com.