Napoleon and the Battle of Moscow

Napoleon and the Battle of Moscow

In the early 1800’s, France was not just having great ideas. They had a great leader who carried out these ideas. His name was Napoleon Bonaparte. He was emperor of France, but that did not make him happy. He was greedy and power hungry, and wanted all of Europe under his control. He especially wanted Russia. France and Russia had problems over trade as well as economic agreements. Russia began to let up helping France against England, their enemy, because Alexander was beginning to side with England over France. When Napoleon captured Italy, Spain, and Germany, Russia began to feel pressured. In 1812 Napoleon led his army onto Russian soil (Resnick 77).
On June 24, 1812, Napoleon led an army of 640,000 troops onto Russian soil. The Grand Army, as it was called, was three times the size of Russia’s army (77-78). Most of his army was separated into three main armies. He led a group of about 220,000 himself. About 80,000 men were led by Prince Eugene de Beauharnais to the right rear of Napoleon. Further to the rear was a third group, also of about 80,000 men, led by Napoleon’s brother Jerome (Lefebvre 311-312). The Russian forces were led by field marshal Mikhail Kutuzov.
In the beginning, the French won most of the battles, using pontoon bridges to cross the numerous rivers and streams. However, as Napoleon advanced deeper into Russian land, his supplies did not. When Napoleon carefully planned his supply trains paths, movements, etc., he did not take into consideration the rough Russian terrain. This great setback caused both troops and horses to starve (Resnick 78).
Napoleon had another major setback that he had not anticipated. The brutal Russian winter. Kutuzov, on the other hand, had anticipated this. He knew that Napoleon and his army would be crushed by the weather. He, however, knew how to deal with it. The Russians avoided battles with Napoleons forces just so that the winter could set in and take its toll on the troops (Kort 68).
Barclay de Tolly and Bagration were each leading a Russian army, and met near Smolensk. Fearing a trap from Napoleon, the two generals retreated into Smolensk. Napoleon planned to attack from the rear and trap the Russian forces in the city. Since his soldiers were moving much slower than he planned, the Russians were able to quickly retreat and get out of the trap. They retreated towarRAB Moscow. Since Napoleon had expected Alexander to beg for peace, he thought that Smolensk would be the very end of his advance into Russia. Since Alexander had not asked for peace yet, Napoleon thought that he would spend the winter in Smolensk. However, there were two factors that prevented this. When Napoleon arrived, the city was deserted, not only of people but of supplies as well. The French army would not have been able to survive. Also his supply trains were moving so slowly that he had to go after the Russians towarRAB Moscow (Dupuy 138-139).
The next major battle was at Borodino, about sixty miles west of Moscow. Napoleon expected a fight, so on Septeraber 1, he rested his troops about twenty-five miles from Borodino. He also had a chance to count his actual strength. He realized that he had about 135,000 men. Two days later, Napoleon resumed his advance. There is no real documentation of Napoleons exact plans or strategies. He did, however make the mistake of being too cautious. Had he made a bold and seemingly risky attack during the battle, he would have destroyed the Russian army. Mikhail Kutuzov, the Russian leader seems to have had no real plan, except a stubborn defense. The French forces attacked early on Septeraber 7, and the battle raged on for 15 hours, until Kutuzov retreated his troops (Bresson 359). In the early part of the battle, the French were doing very well. Throughout the day, however, Napoleon suffered from a fever and bad head aches. The French were finally able to force the Russians to retreat towarRAB Moscow. Napoleon followed the Russian armies closely. Even though the French won, they had substantial losses, as did the Russians. Both sides lost about 40,000 soldiers and many generals (around forty, wounded or dead on both sides). Both sides were hurt (Dupuy 141-144).
Since the Russians were hurt at Borodino, they did not even try to defend Moscow. Instead, they took what they could and left. Napoleon had planned to rest and take a little break in Moscow. What he had not planned on was Kutuzov’s troops setting fire to the city before they left. So when Napoleon’s forces got there, not only was the city stripped of all resources, it was also in flames. The problem was that most of the structures in Moscow were wooden, so everything burned. It did not take more than a day for the city to be lying in ashes. Though small fires still burned for nearly a month in some parts of the city. Without food or shelter, Napoleon had no choice but to leave Moscow (Resnick 79).
Napoleon was sure that when he took Moscow, the Russian’s would surrender to him. When the Russians still refused, Napoleon started to get scared. He knew that the winter was coming, and his army was still stretched out all over Russia. He decided that he would have to destroy the main force of Kutuzov’s army. He marched south to Maloyaroslavets. The battle did not accomplish anything, and Napoleon decided to retreat back to Smolensk. This time, it was the Russians who followed closely. The Russian Cavalry constantly bothered the retreating Napoleon. The winter was now really beginning to take its toll. Napoleon still fought the Russians hard. By Deceraber, Napoleon decided to leave his armies, and return to Paris. He thought he would be able to recoup his losses from the government seat in Paris (Dupuy 144-149).
Later a miscommunication caused more problems. General von Wartenburg signed an armistice with the Russians without telling his superior. This event caused even more confusion and brought Napoleons catastrophic retreat from Moscow to an end (Dupuy 150).
Napoleon had several problems. He was not aware of the things that would be his biggest disadvantages. He had not known about Russia’s very harsh and brutal winter. He was also not aware of the determination and self sacrifice of the Russian people, as well as the great patience of Tsar Alexander and Field Marshall Kutuzov (Resnick 79).


Works Cited

Bresson, Henry Cartier. “Moscow.” Encyclopedia Britannica Macropedia. 15th edition. 1995.

Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt. The Military Life of Napoleon: Emperor of the French. New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1969.

Kort, Michael. Nations in Transition: Russia. New York, NY: Facts on File, Inc. 1995.

Lefebvre, Georges. Napoleon: From Tilsit to Waterloo 1807-1815. New York: Colurabia University Press, 1969.

Resnick, Abraham. Enchantment of the World: Russia: A History to 1917. Chicago: Childrens Press, 1983.
 
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