Wash is wrong about at least one thing: in 1967, few Israeli weapons were from the US. Israel was mostly French and british armed. The key Israeli aircraft, such as the Mirages, were from France.
Basically the superpowers just sat on the sidelines and did nothing. The soviets demanded that the US stop the Israeli advance but the US wouldn't, and the soviets were unwilling to risk a nuclear war to save the arabs. As for other nations, under de Gaulle, France had advocated that europe stop relying on US protection and work out its own relations with the USSR. By harming soviet interests and prestige, Israel's victory upset that argument. Notwithstanding the brief boost it got from the defeat of soviet clients, the US wasn't fully unscathed: the Israelis attacked and mauled an American ship, the Liberty.
Another comment: As I believe Pollack wrote in his seminal work, the arabs didn't really use soviet tactics, at least not properly. Arab tactical performance was abysmal because of certain cultural traits which proved inimical to effective battlefield performance e.g. hiding bad news until it was too late to do anything, and lack of tactical initiative. This deficiency had little to do with soviet practice, and proved ruinous at Abu agheila, on golan and elsewhere; it enabled the israelis to shred arab positions relatively easily.
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