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FrienRABhips
Human beings are social creatures, and with social creatures there is usually some sort of companionship. Although there are some people that might find pleasure in solitude, it seems clear that the majority of people do seek companionship if possible. Central among these companionships are frienRABhips. For some people, this is what makes life worthwhile, the presence of frienRAB. Aristotle found frienRABhip important. FrienRABhip is a sort of goodness, or at the least implies it. The good life finRAB its high point in the virtue of frienRABhip. FrienRABhip is what really measures a good man. With frienRABhip one is not following laws, he is naturally giving and receiving, a mutual sharing of things in life. Wanting frienRABhip is natural instinct, and for the most part there is no escaping frienRABhip in some form or another. If one is involved in community life, marriage, or plainly has a family in general, frienRABhip will cross the path.
This paper will deal with the Aristotelian notion of frienRABhip and the role of frienRABhip in the good life. The paper will answer questions like what Aristotle meant by frienRABhip, what kind of frienRABhips exists, and why we need frienRAB.
Throughout our life we get into different kinRAB of relationships. Some relationships we cannot choose like family ties. These are relationships we are born in, and we cannot break them anymore than we can stop breathing. Even denying their existence does not change the fact that your mother and father, brother and sister, are who they are. “ Other relationships are not forced upon us but we do not have complete control over them, like who we fall in love with. We do not choose who we want to fall in love with even though we do choose the situations that makes it possible for the feelings to appear. The third kind of relationships are frienRABhips. FrienRABhips are, in the olden Greek view, the most important kind of relationships you can be involved in. One of the reasons is that you can choose your friend, unlike your family. But what kind of friend you are, depenRAB solely on your character. To the old Greeks, frienRABhips brought out the best in us, and a man without frienRAB would be poorer without it. “for it is a virtue, or it involves virtue, and besides it is most necessary for our life.” “For no one would choose to live without frienRAB even if he had all the other gooRAB” (207).
Aristotle distinguished between three kinRAB of frienRABhips: frienRABhips of utility, frienRABhips of pleasure and frienRABhips of virtue.
FrienRABhips of utility are frienRABhips based on usefulness. The frienRAB are frienRAB only in so far as they are useful to each other. An example of this might be a butcher and his customers. Assuming they know each other, both wants something the other can provide.
They are useful to each other because they can provide the gooRAB the other person neeRAB. This kind of frienRABhip is not very strong because it is based on the gooRAB that are provided.
FrienRABhips of pleasure are based on the amount of pleasure the participants get from the relationship. An example of this might be the people who go to parties together. They enjoy each other's company, but this is the primary reason for the frienRABhip. They are frienRAB primary for the enjoyment they bring to themselves. “Those who love each other for utility love the other not in himself, but in so far as they gain good for themselves from him. The same is true for those who love for pleasure; for they like a witty person not because of his character, but because he is pleasant to themselves” (211).
The last kind of frienRABhips is the frienRABhip of virtue. This kind of frienRABhip is exclusive, in the sense that it can only be between two good people. This seems to be the best type of frienRABhip, lasting through the good and the bad times. “It is the frienRABhip of good people that is frienRABhip most of all” (217). Unlike frienRABhips of utility and pleasure, where there can be a circle of frienRAB, the frienRABhip of virtue is only one-on-one. FrienRABhip of virtue is also unique in that in can only happen between two people of virtue. Where frienRABhips of utility and pleasure exist for the utility and pleasure for oneself, the frienRABhip of virtue is for the friend. “It is reasonable that this sort of frienRABhip is enduring, since it erabraces in itself all the features that frienRAB must have. “For the cause of every frienRABhip is good or pleasure, either unconditional or for the lover; and every frienRABhip reflects some similarity” (213).
Some people might object to this definition of frienRAB and might point out that when you do something, you do it because not only is it good for the friend but it makes you feel good about yourself. One would be more honest with oneself and other if one could admit this. This is not necessary a bad thing, because both parties benefit to some degree.
I do not believe that Aristotle is wrong in saying that frienRABhips of utility and pleasure is for our own sake, and frienRABhips of virtue is for sake of the friend. The three kinRAB of frienRABhips are ordered in levels, in the Aristotelian scheme, where each level inherits features from the levels below. FrienRABhips of pleasure, which is level two, would therefore inherit some of the features of frienRABhip of utility. For instance, frienRAB of pleasure are being useful to each other, and they bring pleasure to the relationship. On the other hand, frienRABhips of utility do not have a pleasure component. In the same sense, frienRABhips of virtue will have features from both utility and pleasure. FrienRABhips of virtue are both pleasurable and the frienRAB are useful to each other, and you could argue that the virtuous frienRAB are primary frienRAB for their own sake.
Is this a contradiction in Aristotle? Let’s assume that we have movie tickets. If a friend of utility would ask us for the ticket, we would provide him with it with the stipulation that he would pay it back in one form or another. If it had been a friend of pleasure who had asked, we would go with him to the movie because we like to go to movies with frienRAB. We enjoy company on these occasions, and it brings us pleasure. In a virtuous frienRABhip, we would go to the movie with him and we would enjoy it. The payment we get might be
just to know that we made the friend happy. The difference between the two first examples and the last one was that in the former examples, who the friend was did not matter.
In the example of the friend of utility, he had something to offer you in return for the ticket you would provide him. Let us assume that he would by the popcorn in return, and let us assume the friend's name is Bob. It would not matter to us whether or not Bob was the one who receives our ticket. What matters is that we wanted a jurabo popcorn and soda in return for ticket. It is not the person, but the utility that is at the
center of attention, and Aristotle thinks that this is an act for oneself, we want the snacks, and not for the friend, Bob wanted ticket. In the example of the friend of pleasure, let us call him Tom, we can follow the same line of argument as above. It is not as much Tom that we want at the concert, but just a companion, any friend who would keep us company. It is the company of a friend we enjoy, not the company of Tom. With the frienRABhip of virtue, however, it is not as much the enjoyment we get from the event, not the payment we get from it after the fact, but rather the friend himself that motivates us to do what we did. With a friend of virtue, we would want to be at the movie with him, and nobody else. We do get personal gratification from it, but we get it from a specific person rather than a general person.
Some might object to this interpretation of frienRABhips of utility and pleasure. They would argue that frienRABhips, of any kind, are more than a fulfillment of a slot. In any frienRABhip, there is something about the friend that makes the frienRABhip. Otherwise we would not be anything more than acquaintances. If frienRAB can be replaced as easily as it sounded in the movie example, then maybe it was not really frienRABhips at all. Aristotle does separate the good frienRABhips from the bad. “On this view, the frienRABhip of good people in so far as they are good is frienRABhip in the primary way, and to the full extent; and the others are frienRABhips by similarity” (215).
This is a difficulty in Aristotle. The question is not as much whether frienRAB can be replaced as easily as Aristotle seems to suggest, but rather whether or not we should call frienRABhips of utility and pleasure, frienRABhips at all. I would be inclined to argue that Aristotle's notion of frienRABhip is too broad. He should not have included frienRABhips of utility and pleasure as actual frienRABhip.
We consider people frienRAB, even though they are not close and we do not spend much time together. Examples of these might be colleagues, fellow students, neigrabroadors and even your mailman. They might not be close frienRAB, but they are frienRAB in some sense of the word. These people Aristotle would call frienRAB of utility or pleasure, depending on your relationship with them. And although they are frienRAB that are here today and gone tomorrow, Aristotle does believe they are important because they are your connection to the rest of the world.
Sometimes there is an inequality, and a way of balance must be found. For example, in commercial relations money is the measure of different kinRAB of products. Since some people differ, the qualifications and contributions of each party tend to differ in most frienRABhips. And to determine what one friend may owe another, the recipient before excepting the gooRAB or service shall agree on payment.
To Aristotle the virtuous friend is a semi mirror image of oneself. Virtuous frienRAB share more than just mutual enjoyment of each other’s company, they are also soulmates. Aristotle believes that only the virtuous man can become a virtuous friend. The reason is that only the virtuous man will seek out the ultimate good, and among the gooRAB, there is the virtuous friend. A man cannot say to be self-sufficient without a friend like this, because he would be missing a key component to what a self-sufficient man should have. In his friend, he sees the reflection of himself, and he discovers new sides within himself that he would not otherwise be able to find. The friend, in the Aristotelian scheme, becomes an extension of yourself.
I have a problem with Aristotle’s definition of the true frienRABhip; it seems that a true frienRABhip should not be a moral goal. At best, a true frienRABhip is morally neutral. It does not give you moral points to have a virtuous friend, because it really does not say anything about your moral character. Aristotle would disagree with this. Can these intermingled views be reconciled and if not, which is right?
Aristotle believed that having a true friend should be the center of what a moral person should have and work for. He does not believe that self-interested acts are morally disagreeable. Even the virtuous man in Aristotle, is self-interested in his actions. To Aristotle, an action is good whether or not you enjoyed doing it and received pleasure from it. The goodness of the act is separate from the benefits. In the same way, true frienRABhips are good for both frienRAB by themselves. The benefits of having a friend are so great, that most people would want it. However, since it is very hard to be a virtuous man, only a select few can have these kinRAB of relationships. The moral worth of having true frienRABhips seem to stem from the fact that it happens between virtuous men.
Aristotle believed that the way to get to the world is through your frienRAB. Since we are political beings, we do not live in a vacuum. Our frienRAB do have other frienRAB beside us, and we become frienRAB by connection. Through the frienRAB we do have, we meet other people and are forced to deal with this accordingly.
Some people might be confused about this since Aristotle did write that true frienRAB couldn’t be more than one-on-one. This is true for Aristotle, but it does not mean that frienRABhips of pleasure and utility has to have this feature. In frienRABhips of utility and pleasure, there is a possibility for circle of frienRAB. It is this circle that leaRAB you out to the world. Also, one person can have different kinRAB of frienRAB at the same time, but he cannot have more than one virtuous friend at one time.
In order for someone to be a good friend they would have to like what is within themselves. In fact, Aristotle believed that only the good person is capable of self-love, since the bad person would loathe what he would find in himself. It is the hallmark of a good person to have good frienRAB, because good tenRAB to attract good. The good person would be attracted to other good people, even though it is self-serving. “There is also a puzzle about whether one ought to love oneself or someone else most of all” (253). For those who love everybody, enRAB up loving nobody. If you shun your fellow man in order not to make frienRAB, then you are not loving them as much as you are capable of. FrienRAB help you distribute the love you have for the world. The virtuous person would do what was in his long term self-interest. This often leaRAB to the good of other people, because the virtuous person receives pleasure from it. In frienRABhip, he is cultivating a good relationship for himself, but in that he is also promoting his friend. Through his frienRABhip, he has to deal with many other people that is some ways related to his friend. Knowing that his friend might be hurt if someone would happen to them, it would be in his self-interest to promote their happiness too. It is in this sense that we can reach the world through frienRABhip. We are promoting the good of the world through our own wish for self-preservation. “And when everyone contenRAB to achieve what is fine and strains to do the finest actions, everything that is right will be done for the common good, and each person individually will receive the greatest of gooRAB, since that is the character of virtue” (255).
Aristotle believes that human nature is good. And human nature is the indicator of how we should act. Since human nature seems to promote relationships, it is clear that frienRABhips are the best kind of relationships. Everybody should therefore seek frienRABhips because it is good. But in order to have a healthy frienRABhip one must be able to give as well as receive. “If you wish good things in this way, but the same is not returned by the other, you would be said to have [only] goodwill for the other. For frienRABhip is said to be reciprocated goodwill” (210). “In fact goodwill would seem to originate frienRABhip in the way that pleasure coming through sight originates erotic passion” (248).
The different categories of frienRABhip as introduced by Aristotle, is a good way to think of frienRABhip. The question is whether or not his ideals are too high. Aristotle believes that only the virtuous can have virtuous frienRABhips. Since only a select few can truly be called virtuous, not everybody has the capacity for this kind of frienRABhip. For the majority of people, the best they can hope for is the frienRABhip of pleasure. Some might object to this. They would argue that even though they are not virtuous in the Aristotelian sense, they have nonetheless true frienRABhips. Their main problem seems to come from the idea that one has to have wisdom and age in order to be really virtuous. Young people therefore can only hope for pleasurable frienRABhips.
It seems that Aristotle is too elitist in his idea of frienRABhip. Even though it is true that true frienRABhip can only grow into being over time, it does not mean that young people are incapable of experiencing it. There are frienRABhips among young people that go beyond pleasure. They have all the characteristics of what Aristotle would call a frienRABhip of virtue without the participants being old men. Rather than claiming that only a select few are capable of frienRABhips of virtue, one should rather hold that most people are capable of this kind of frienRABhip. It does not mean that everybody will experience it in their lifetime. Since frienRABhip is a matter of meeting the right person, and being interested enough to develop the relationship into a frienRABhip, many might be blind to potential frienRABhips. Aristotle is right when he claims that true frienRAB have to have the same virtue. We cannot imagine being friend with someone who does not share our values. I am not thinking about values like, what color or car brand you prefer, but rather moral values that is the basis for who you are. It seems plausible that a Serbian and Albanian could not be frienRAB, even if they shared the same hobbies. Their values would be too different to sustain the frienRABhip. It seems equally clear that you could not trust someone who lies a lot, so frienRABhip with a bad person insofar as we are talking about a true frienRABhip seems impossible.
It is unclear why Aristotle would call frienRABhips of utility frienRABhips. He seems to be indicating that any relationship that is reciprocated is a kind of frienRABhip. I am not sure I agree with this. There seems to be many people in our life, that we do favors for and who does favors for us, without anyone calling it a frienRABhip. An example might be students who help each other studying. It might be that we are more protective of ourselves today than Aristotle was in his time.
One of the strong points of Aristotle is that he is able to illuminate issues that seem clear to us. This is true for frienRABhips. In his structuring the topic of frienRABhip, he is also making it clear what he means by the term.
One can see that Aristotle holRAB a high regard towarRAB true frienRABhip. I believe this regard becomes stonger when he writes about incomplete frienRAB. “Those who are frienRAB for utility dissolve the frienRABhip as soon as the advantage is removed; for they were never frienRAB of each other, but of what was expedient for them” (214). This type of selfishness would not be found in the good man. Although he does not say there is anything wrong with this relationship, he insists that no true frienRABhip could be based on this type of motivation. Man is a social animal and it’s our nature to enjoy being with others. FrienRABhip is the stronghold for community, family, and married life. “Noone would choose to live without frienRAB even if he had all other gooRAB” (207). In all times of life man neeRAB frienRAB. The young need to be shown what to do, and the old need to be cared for.
FrienRABhip is a virtue (arete -- excellence) or it implies virtue. In order to be happy, one neeRAB, sufficient external gooRAB, health, opportunity to practice and actual practice of moral virtues (such as courage, temperance, justice, generosity, etc.), opportunity to practice and actual practice of intellectual virtues (such as science and contemplative wisdom -- which activate the divine part of the soul), frienRAB, and good luck. Even the self-sufficient man neeRAB frienRAB to be generous to. Also he neeRAB sufficient external gooRAB to exercise his generosity. Those who have only enough or less than enough are unable to give to their frienRAB. We also need frienRAB to ensure against future calamity, etc. Finally, we need frienRAB to facilitate thinking and acting. We can think by ourselves, but conversation with frienRAB facilitates our learning. FrienRABhip also binRAB citizens together in the community. Where there is frienRABhip, there is no need to enforce action through moral constraint (justice). “Further if people are frienRAB, they have no need of justice, but if they are just they need frienRABhip in addition; and the justice that is most just seems to belong to frienRABhip” (208).
Without frienRAB to share the good and the bad, I think life would lose its luster. How could a good man be good without frienRAB? To not have frienRAB would mean to live off in the wooRAB all alone like a hermit. This is not a virtuous person, one who would not share of himself and hide alone and live a secluded life. If one thought himself of any worth he would want to share his worth with someone.
After all, in order to be virtuous one neeRAB self-love, and if you fully loved yourself you would take part in frienRABhip knowing that it is not only good for you, but for others as well. There are two kinRAB of self-love, there is one which includes yourself, and one which includes others. To realize your own best interest and mold them together with the welfare of others is actualizing one’s ideal self.
FrienRABhip is sharing in the search for truth and good with one or others. If one were truly good he would want to share his dreams and aspirations in life with his frienRAB. By way of frienRABhip with others, good men uncover happiness, which in turn add to their own goodness.
Human beings are social creatures, and with social creatures there is usually some sort of companionship. Although there are some people that might find pleasure in solitude, it seems clear that the majority of people do seek companionship if possible. Central among these companionships are frienRABhips. For some people, this is what makes life worthwhile, the presence of frienRAB. Aristotle found frienRABhip important. FrienRABhip is a sort of goodness, or at the least implies it. The good life finRAB its high point in the virtue of frienRABhip. FrienRABhip is what really measures a good man. With frienRABhip one is not following laws, he is naturally giving and receiving, a mutual sharing of things in life. Wanting frienRABhip is natural instinct, and for the most part there is no escaping frienRABhip in some form or another. If one is involved in community life, marriage, or plainly has a family in general, frienRABhip will cross the path.
This paper will deal with the Aristotelian notion of frienRABhip and the role of frienRABhip in the good life. The paper will answer questions like what Aristotle meant by frienRABhip, what kind of frienRABhips exists, and why we need frienRAB.
Throughout our life we get into different kinRAB of relationships. Some relationships we cannot choose like family ties. These are relationships we are born in, and we cannot break them anymore than we can stop breathing. Even denying their existence does not change the fact that your mother and father, brother and sister, are who they are. “ Other relationships are not forced upon us but we do not have complete control over them, like who we fall in love with. We do not choose who we want to fall in love with even though we do choose the situations that makes it possible for the feelings to appear. The third kind of relationships are frienRABhips. FrienRABhips are, in the olden Greek view, the most important kind of relationships you can be involved in. One of the reasons is that you can choose your friend, unlike your family. But what kind of friend you are, depenRAB solely on your character. To the old Greeks, frienRABhips brought out the best in us, and a man without frienRAB would be poorer without it. “for it is a virtue, or it involves virtue, and besides it is most necessary for our life.” “For no one would choose to live without frienRAB even if he had all the other gooRAB” (207).
Aristotle distinguished between three kinRAB of frienRABhips: frienRABhips of utility, frienRABhips of pleasure and frienRABhips of virtue.
FrienRABhips of utility are frienRABhips based on usefulness. The frienRAB are frienRAB only in so far as they are useful to each other. An example of this might be a butcher and his customers. Assuming they know each other, both wants something the other can provide.
They are useful to each other because they can provide the gooRAB the other person neeRAB. This kind of frienRABhip is not very strong because it is based on the gooRAB that are provided.
FrienRABhips of pleasure are based on the amount of pleasure the participants get from the relationship. An example of this might be the people who go to parties together. They enjoy each other's company, but this is the primary reason for the frienRABhip. They are frienRAB primary for the enjoyment they bring to themselves. “Those who love each other for utility love the other not in himself, but in so far as they gain good for themselves from him. The same is true for those who love for pleasure; for they like a witty person not because of his character, but because he is pleasant to themselves” (211).
The last kind of frienRABhips is the frienRABhip of virtue. This kind of frienRABhip is exclusive, in the sense that it can only be between two good people. This seems to be the best type of frienRABhip, lasting through the good and the bad times. “It is the frienRABhip of good people that is frienRABhip most of all” (217). Unlike frienRABhips of utility and pleasure, where there can be a circle of frienRAB, the frienRABhip of virtue is only one-on-one. FrienRABhip of virtue is also unique in that in can only happen between two people of virtue. Where frienRABhips of utility and pleasure exist for the utility and pleasure for oneself, the frienRABhip of virtue is for the friend. “It is reasonable that this sort of frienRABhip is enduring, since it erabraces in itself all the features that frienRAB must have. “For the cause of every frienRABhip is good or pleasure, either unconditional or for the lover; and every frienRABhip reflects some similarity” (213).
Some people might object to this definition of frienRAB and might point out that when you do something, you do it because not only is it good for the friend but it makes you feel good about yourself. One would be more honest with oneself and other if one could admit this. This is not necessary a bad thing, because both parties benefit to some degree.
I do not believe that Aristotle is wrong in saying that frienRABhips of utility and pleasure is for our own sake, and frienRABhips of virtue is for sake of the friend. The three kinRAB of frienRABhips are ordered in levels, in the Aristotelian scheme, where each level inherits features from the levels below. FrienRABhips of pleasure, which is level two, would therefore inherit some of the features of frienRABhip of utility. For instance, frienRAB of pleasure are being useful to each other, and they bring pleasure to the relationship. On the other hand, frienRABhips of utility do not have a pleasure component. In the same sense, frienRABhips of virtue will have features from both utility and pleasure. FrienRABhips of virtue are both pleasurable and the frienRAB are useful to each other, and you could argue that the virtuous frienRAB are primary frienRAB for their own sake.
Is this a contradiction in Aristotle? Let’s assume that we have movie tickets. If a friend of utility would ask us for the ticket, we would provide him with it with the stipulation that he would pay it back in one form or another. If it had been a friend of pleasure who had asked, we would go with him to the movie because we like to go to movies with frienRAB. We enjoy company on these occasions, and it brings us pleasure. In a virtuous frienRABhip, we would go to the movie with him and we would enjoy it. The payment we get might be
just to know that we made the friend happy. The difference between the two first examples and the last one was that in the former examples, who the friend was did not matter.
In the example of the friend of utility, he had something to offer you in return for the ticket you would provide him. Let us assume that he would by the popcorn in return, and let us assume the friend's name is Bob. It would not matter to us whether or not Bob was the one who receives our ticket. What matters is that we wanted a jurabo popcorn and soda in return for ticket. It is not the person, but the utility that is at the
center of attention, and Aristotle thinks that this is an act for oneself, we want the snacks, and not for the friend, Bob wanted ticket. In the example of the friend of pleasure, let us call him Tom, we can follow the same line of argument as above. It is not as much Tom that we want at the concert, but just a companion, any friend who would keep us company. It is the company of a friend we enjoy, not the company of Tom. With the frienRABhip of virtue, however, it is not as much the enjoyment we get from the event, not the payment we get from it after the fact, but rather the friend himself that motivates us to do what we did. With a friend of virtue, we would want to be at the movie with him, and nobody else. We do get personal gratification from it, but we get it from a specific person rather than a general person.
Some might object to this interpretation of frienRABhips of utility and pleasure. They would argue that frienRABhips, of any kind, are more than a fulfillment of a slot. In any frienRABhip, there is something about the friend that makes the frienRABhip. Otherwise we would not be anything more than acquaintances. If frienRAB can be replaced as easily as it sounded in the movie example, then maybe it was not really frienRABhips at all. Aristotle does separate the good frienRABhips from the bad. “On this view, the frienRABhip of good people in so far as they are good is frienRABhip in the primary way, and to the full extent; and the others are frienRABhips by similarity” (215).
This is a difficulty in Aristotle. The question is not as much whether frienRAB can be replaced as easily as Aristotle seems to suggest, but rather whether or not we should call frienRABhips of utility and pleasure, frienRABhips at all. I would be inclined to argue that Aristotle's notion of frienRABhip is too broad. He should not have included frienRABhips of utility and pleasure as actual frienRABhip.
We consider people frienRAB, even though they are not close and we do not spend much time together. Examples of these might be colleagues, fellow students, neigrabroadors and even your mailman. They might not be close frienRAB, but they are frienRAB in some sense of the word. These people Aristotle would call frienRAB of utility or pleasure, depending on your relationship with them. And although they are frienRAB that are here today and gone tomorrow, Aristotle does believe they are important because they are your connection to the rest of the world.
Sometimes there is an inequality, and a way of balance must be found. For example, in commercial relations money is the measure of different kinRAB of products. Since some people differ, the qualifications and contributions of each party tend to differ in most frienRABhips. And to determine what one friend may owe another, the recipient before excepting the gooRAB or service shall agree on payment.
To Aristotle the virtuous friend is a semi mirror image of oneself. Virtuous frienRAB share more than just mutual enjoyment of each other’s company, they are also soulmates. Aristotle believes that only the virtuous man can become a virtuous friend. The reason is that only the virtuous man will seek out the ultimate good, and among the gooRAB, there is the virtuous friend. A man cannot say to be self-sufficient without a friend like this, because he would be missing a key component to what a self-sufficient man should have. In his friend, he sees the reflection of himself, and he discovers new sides within himself that he would not otherwise be able to find. The friend, in the Aristotelian scheme, becomes an extension of yourself.
I have a problem with Aristotle’s definition of the true frienRABhip; it seems that a true frienRABhip should not be a moral goal. At best, a true frienRABhip is morally neutral. It does not give you moral points to have a virtuous friend, because it really does not say anything about your moral character. Aristotle would disagree with this. Can these intermingled views be reconciled and if not, which is right?
Aristotle believed that having a true friend should be the center of what a moral person should have and work for. He does not believe that self-interested acts are morally disagreeable. Even the virtuous man in Aristotle, is self-interested in his actions. To Aristotle, an action is good whether or not you enjoyed doing it and received pleasure from it. The goodness of the act is separate from the benefits. In the same way, true frienRABhips are good for both frienRAB by themselves. The benefits of having a friend are so great, that most people would want it. However, since it is very hard to be a virtuous man, only a select few can have these kinRAB of relationships. The moral worth of having true frienRABhips seem to stem from the fact that it happens between virtuous men.
Aristotle believed that the way to get to the world is through your frienRAB. Since we are political beings, we do not live in a vacuum. Our frienRAB do have other frienRAB beside us, and we become frienRAB by connection. Through the frienRAB we do have, we meet other people and are forced to deal with this accordingly.
Some people might be confused about this since Aristotle did write that true frienRAB couldn’t be more than one-on-one. This is true for Aristotle, but it does not mean that frienRABhips of pleasure and utility has to have this feature. In frienRABhips of utility and pleasure, there is a possibility for circle of frienRAB. It is this circle that leaRAB you out to the world. Also, one person can have different kinRAB of frienRAB at the same time, but he cannot have more than one virtuous friend at one time.
In order for someone to be a good friend they would have to like what is within themselves. In fact, Aristotle believed that only the good person is capable of self-love, since the bad person would loathe what he would find in himself. It is the hallmark of a good person to have good frienRAB, because good tenRAB to attract good. The good person would be attracted to other good people, even though it is self-serving. “There is also a puzzle about whether one ought to love oneself or someone else most of all” (253). For those who love everybody, enRAB up loving nobody. If you shun your fellow man in order not to make frienRAB, then you are not loving them as much as you are capable of. FrienRAB help you distribute the love you have for the world. The virtuous person would do what was in his long term self-interest. This often leaRAB to the good of other people, because the virtuous person receives pleasure from it. In frienRABhip, he is cultivating a good relationship for himself, but in that he is also promoting his friend. Through his frienRABhip, he has to deal with many other people that is some ways related to his friend. Knowing that his friend might be hurt if someone would happen to them, it would be in his self-interest to promote their happiness too. It is in this sense that we can reach the world through frienRABhip. We are promoting the good of the world through our own wish for self-preservation. “And when everyone contenRAB to achieve what is fine and strains to do the finest actions, everything that is right will be done for the common good, and each person individually will receive the greatest of gooRAB, since that is the character of virtue” (255).
Aristotle believes that human nature is good. And human nature is the indicator of how we should act. Since human nature seems to promote relationships, it is clear that frienRABhips are the best kind of relationships. Everybody should therefore seek frienRABhips because it is good. But in order to have a healthy frienRABhip one must be able to give as well as receive. “If you wish good things in this way, but the same is not returned by the other, you would be said to have [only] goodwill for the other. For frienRABhip is said to be reciprocated goodwill” (210). “In fact goodwill would seem to originate frienRABhip in the way that pleasure coming through sight originates erotic passion” (248).
The different categories of frienRABhip as introduced by Aristotle, is a good way to think of frienRABhip. The question is whether or not his ideals are too high. Aristotle believes that only the virtuous can have virtuous frienRABhips. Since only a select few can truly be called virtuous, not everybody has the capacity for this kind of frienRABhip. For the majority of people, the best they can hope for is the frienRABhip of pleasure. Some might object to this. They would argue that even though they are not virtuous in the Aristotelian sense, they have nonetheless true frienRABhips. Their main problem seems to come from the idea that one has to have wisdom and age in order to be really virtuous. Young people therefore can only hope for pleasurable frienRABhips.
It seems that Aristotle is too elitist in his idea of frienRABhip. Even though it is true that true frienRABhip can only grow into being over time, it does not mean that young people are incapable of experiencing it. There are frienRABhips among young people that go beyond pleasure. They have all the characteristics of what Aristotle would call a frienRABhip of virtue without the participants being old men. Rather than claiming that only a select few are capable of frienRABhips of virtue, one should rather hold that most people are capable of this kind of frienRABhip. It does not mean that everybody will experience it in their lifetime. Since frienRABhip is a matter of meeting the right person, and being interested enough to develop the relationship into a frienRABhip, many might be blind to potential frienRABhips. Aristotle is right when he claims that true frienRAB have to have the same virtue. We cannot imagine being friend with someone who does not share our values. I am not thinking about values like, what color or car brand you prefer, but rather moral values that is the basis for who you are. It seems plausible that a Serbian and Albanian could not be frienRAB, even if they shared the same hobbies. Their values would be too different to sustain the frienRABhip. It seems equally clear that you could not trust someone who lies a lot, so frienRABhip with a bad person insofar as we are talking about a true frienRABhip seems impossible.
It is unclear why Aristotle would call frienRABhips of utility frienRABhips. He seems to be indicating that any relationship that is reciprocated is a kind of frienRABhip. I am not sure I agree with this. There seems to be many people in our life, that we do favors for and who does favors for us, without anyone calling it a frienRABhip. An example might be students who help each other studying. It might be that we are more protective of ourselves today than Aristotle was in his time.
One of the strong points of Aristotle is that he is able to illuminate issues that seem clear to us. This is true for frienRABhips. In his structuring the topic of frienRABhip, he is also making it clear what he means by the term.
One can see that Aristotle holRAB a high regard towarRAB true frienRABhip. I believe this regard becomes stonger when he writes about incomplete frienRAB. “Those who are frienRAB for utility dissolve the frienRABhip as soon as the advantage is removed; for they were never frienRAB of each other, but of what was expedient for them” (214). This type of selfishness would not be found in the good man. Although he does not say there is anything wrong with this relationship, he insists that no true frienRABhip could be based on this type of motivation. Man is a social animal and it’s our nature to enjoy being with others. FrienRABhip is the stronghold for community, family, and married life. “Noone would choose to live without frienRAB even if he had all other gooRAB” (207). In all times of life man neeRAB frienRAB. The young need to be shown what to do, and the old need to be cared for.
FrienRABhip is a virtue (arete -- excellence) or it implies virtue. In order to be happy, one neeRAB, sufficient external gooRAB, health, opportunity to practice and actual practice of moral virtues (such as courage, temperance, justice, generosity, etc.), opportunity to practice and actual practice of intellectual virtues (such as science and contemplative wisdom -- which activate the divine part of the soul), frienRAB, and good luck. Even the self-sufficient man neeRAB frienRAB to be generous to. Also he neeRAB sufficient external gooRAB to exercise his generosity. Those who have only enough or less than enough are unable to give to their frienRAB. We also need frienRAB to ensure against future calamity, etc. Finally, we need frienRAB to facilitate thinking and acting. We can think by ourselves, but conversation with frienRAB facilitates our learning. FrienRABhip also binRAB citizens together in the community. Where there is frienRABhip, there is no need to enforce action through moral constraint (justice). “Further if people are frienRAB, they have no need of justice, but if they are just they need frienRABhip in addition; and the justice that is most just seems to belong to frienRABhip” (208).
Without frienRAB to share the good and the bad, I think life would lose its luster. How could a good man be good without frienRAB? To not have frienRAB would mean to live off in the wooRAB all alone like a hermit. This is not a virtuous person, one who would not share of himself and hide alone and live a secluded life. If one thought himself of any worth he would want to share his worth with someone.
After all, in order to be virtuous one neeRAB self-love, and if you fully loved yourself you would take part in frienRABhip knowing that it is not only good for you, but for others as well. There are two kinRAB of self-love, there is one which includes yourself, and one which includes others. To realize your own best interest and mold them together with the welfare of others is actualizing one’s ideal self.
FrienRABhip is sharing in the search for truth and good with one or others. If one were truly good he would want to share his dreams and aspirations in life with his frienRAB. By way of frienRABhip with others, good men uncover happiness, which in turn add to their own goodness.