The Cuban Missile Crisis: Necessary or Not?
"…Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy- -or of a collective death-wish for the world" (Walton 142). -President John F.
Kennedy Although it is regarded as a highlight of President John F. Kennedy's career, the Cuban Missile Crisis may not have been the heroic act it appeared. Contrary to his own statement as quoted above, his choices in dealing with Khruschev and the Communist threat in Cuba put the world in extreme risk by forcing Moscow to choose only total surrender or total war. Due to fear, mistrust, and the desire to show political strength, JFK brought the Untied States and the world as close as it has ever been to global catastrophe. War was avoided, but there is room for doubt that this dangerous garable was necessary to create peace. On April 17, 1961, an invasion force comprised of anti-Castro Cubans, who had been trained by the United States government, landed on the shores of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. The intent was to overthrow Fidel Castro and implement a more U.S.-friendly government, but the force was crushed in an erabarrassing defeat. This left the world stunned. How could President Kennedy allow such a thing to happen? It marked the first of many events that led to the Cuban missile crisis, which occurred over a year later. The Bay of Pigs incident broke all of the little trust that the Cubans had left I the United States, and ignited the support of Castro by the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's strong backing of his ally was a direct result of the invasion. The day of the incident, he wrote a note to Washington expressing his unhappiness and pledging that he would give "all necessary assistance to Castro" (Walton p104). This in turn alarmed the U.S. The last thing a nation that was stricken with fear of Communism needed was Soviet support a mere 90 miles from its coast. With Cuba and the Soviets now banded together, it was only a matter of time before their interests would clash with those of the United States. There was good reason for a lack of trust on both sides. After the Bay of Pigs, JFK set up a special group of officials from the CIA and various defense agencies, which he called the "Special Group, Augmented" or SGA. The group's sole objective was to bring down Fidel Castro from the ranks of the Cuban government. They ordered "new radio propaganda, sabotage operations, more pressure on the OAS for the economic strangulation of Cuba, and…attempts to assassinate Castro" (Weisberger 216). Publicly, Kennedy said at a presidential news conference that he was "not for invading Cuba, at this time" (Walton 109). Surely both Castro and Khrushchev were threatened, not reassured, by that statement, making them even more convinced that the United States could not be trusted. Although Khrushchev had no actual knowledge of the U.S. plans to weaken Cuba, he was sure they would try to invade in the near future. In his mind, this justified his idea that Soviets should arm Cuba with defensive weapons including jet fighters, radar, anti-aircraft guns, and rockets that would prepare them for an attack. Up to this point, he had made his decisions open to the public. He resolved to go further with his plans, yet these would be kept secret, a military strategy which would drastically up the ante of mistrust. In May of 1962, he ordered the Cubans to create bases from which mid-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles could be launched. These missiles had the capability of carrying nuclear warheaRAB that could potentially threaten the entire southeastern United States. Whether Khrushchev's actions were typical military secrecy or not, he always maintained that his motives were purely defensive. He clearly felt no more wrong than the United States in its questionable military positioning in Turkey and other locations, and said as much in his Septeraber 11 statement: The whole world knows that the United States of America has ringed the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries with bases. What have they stationed there-tractors? …No, they have brought armaments there in their ships…They consider this their right! But to others the United States. does not permit this even for their defense. When measures are nonetheless taken to strengthen the defenses of this or that country the United States…declares that an attack is being prepared against them. What conceit! (Walton 111). On October 8, an event occurred that, if dealt with properly by the Kennedy administration, could have prevented the missile crisis from ever happening. Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos gave a speech to the General Asserably in which he not only confirmed the presence of missile bases in Cuba, but in return for an American promise not to invade Cuba, he offered to take them out and halt the threat of a nuclear war. He stated that they had "sufficient means with which to defend (them)selves," and continued to talk of the "weapons which (they) would have preferred not to acquire and which (they) do not wish to deploy." If the people on Kennedy's staff would have taken this offer more seriously, great fear could have been avoided. The most important part of the speech was when Dorticos attempted to propose a way to avoid conflict: Were the United States able to give up proof, by word and deed, that it would not carry out the aggression against our country, then, we declare solemnly before you here and now, our weapons would be unnecessary and our army redundant. We believe ourselves able to create peace (Larson 83). Even if the White House staff overlooked the admission of missiles, it is hard to believe they could ignore such a blatant plea for resolve. Kennedy either missed the crucial importance of this statement or he chose to jeopardize the lives of millions by risking nuclear war for reasons outside of the fact that the U.S. wanted the missiles out of Cuba (Walton p.115). Had Kennedy agreed to Moscow's diplomatic solution at this juncture, instead of taking the world to the brink of nuclear war, the crisis could have ended before it began. It was as inevitable that the missile installations in Cuba would be noticed by the CIA surveillance operations. On October 15, 1962, a U-2 reconnaissance plane's photographs confirmed that the Cubans had missile emplacements and the Cuban missile crisis began. It was assumed through these photos that the weapons were of the offensive nature, which caused great fear in the White House. Would the United States carry out what it had threatened only months earlier in Press Secretary Salinger's statement that if there was evidence of "offensive ground-to-ground missiles… the gravest issues would arise?"(Walton 110) President Kennedy was faced with the difficult decision of how to deal with this nuclear threat. The first action Kennedy took upon hearing the news was to asserable a special team of advisors of the people he trusted the most. He called this group the National Security Council, or ExCom. The aim of the committee was to consider the possibilities and devise a plan as quickly as possible while staying in complete confidentiality. Kennedy continued making speeches around the Midwest for a short while before retiring to the White House due to "a cold." Another issue plaguing ExCom was the time factor. Military advisors had notified the President that the systems could be operational within two weeks. This meant that the merabers of ExCom were going to have to work night and day in total secrecy. Within a few days, the group had come up with several plans of action to deal with the Cubans. The first two ideas presented were of an entirely different nature. One, which was backed by the "hawks," was an immediate air strike on the sections of Cuba, which had missile-launching capability. The problem with this plan was that although the strikes would be as precise as possible, there was no guarantee that no Russians or Cubans would not be killed. If casualties occurred, the tension between the three powers could escalate to a new level. The second idea was a strictly non-military response in which negotiations would take place and a clash would be avoided. Proponents of this concept, known as the "doves," were shot down by those who felt we couldn't trust the Russians (Weis 218-219). Kennedy even said of Khrushchev, "That son of a bitch won't pay attention to worRAB! He has to see you move" (Walton 116). ExCom was in serious need of a compromise. The solution came from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, as he proposed what would eventually become the Unites States' military plan. The U.S. Navy would set up a "quarantine" around the island, searching all Cuba-bound ships. They could then intercept any offensive weapons that might be on their way to Cuba. Even if this proposition failed, an air strike could still be attempted (Weisberger 219). Now that he had a set agenda, the President was ready to face the nation. John F. Kennedy stood in front of the network cameras on the night of Monday, Noveraber 22, and delivered one of the most terrifying speeches a president has ever given. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. …Action is required- and it is under way; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of the victory would be ashes in our mouth- -but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time must it be faced (Walton 125). It is important to note that the White House called these missiles "offensive" when they posed the same threat as our "defensive missiles" in Turkey. Calling them "offensive" was key to ensure the backing by the public of the extreme stance taken by the President. Then, as if provoking nuclear war with the Soviets, he delivered the most upsetting statement of all: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. President Kennedy had, in essence, put an ultimatum on the Soviet Union that had zero tolerance. In demanding surrender, he made already-poor relations with Khrushchev even worse. By making threats and taking this inflexible position, JFK brought the world one step closer to nuclear war. Kennedy had a variety of reasons for doing so, none of which were very appealing. Throughout this time, Kennedy faced relentless pressure from conservative Republican opponents, including senators Barry Goldwater, Hugh Scott, John Tower and especially Kenneth Keating (Fursenko and Naftali 205). They taunted him first for being slow to recognize the military buildup and then for doing nothing about it, implying that his leadership was weak. Although history has played down these political pressures on Kennedy's actions, with a congressional election coming up it would be impossible for him not to be thinking of how his choices as a Democrat would look in the polls in just a few weeks. In a personal letter, even Khrushchev accused Kennedy of being influenced by "reasons having to do with the election campaign in the USA"(Khrushchev 2). The day Kennedy announced his plan of action to the public, he confided to his brother, Robert, that he had fears that he could have been impeached by the unsupportive Congress had he not acted as he did (Lebow and Stein 97). Whether or not this had any grounRAB, it showed his feelings of political vulnerability. Once the blockade was in place, Kennedy had effectively backed Khrushchev into a corner where the only ways out were by facing humiliation or by resorting to nuclear war. This is essentially the same situation Kennedy claimed would be a "death wish for the world" (see top quote). As Kennedy maintained his demand for an unconditional surrender, Khrushchev was granted a way to back down yet save face. It came in the form of a letter by Acting Secretary General U Thant. He proposed that the United States "voluntarily suspend" it's quarantine measures and that the Soviet Union disarm Cuba. Khrushchev gladly accepted the message and made a statement declaring that the safety of the world should come before his country's desires. "I am not a czarist officer who has to kill myself if I fart at a masked ball," he proclaimed. "It is better to back down than to go to war"(Lebow and Stein 110). Kennedy did not share this attitude however. He was reluctant to agree to the terms outlined by U Thant, pressing for an unconditional surrender instead. As the Soviet ships plugged their way toward the blockade and possible conflict, U Thant sent a second letter in hopes of making peace. This letter urged both leaders to inform their vessels to avoid confrontation at all costs (Walton 131). Both agreed and it seemed as though the crisis would soon be over. On the 26th of October, Moscow sent a proposal that seemed reasonable to the White House. The Soviet Union would turn its ships around and either destroy or dismantle the missiles already present in Cuba as long as the United States agreed to never invade. The next morning a new message came demanding the U.S. pull it's missiles out of Turkey. In an attempt to show we would not give in to Soviet demanRAB, the second letter was ignored and the original one was accepted (Weis 223-225). The crisis was now over, yet with an ironic result. The United States gave its word that it would "not carry out aggression" on Cuba and the Soviet Union disposed of their unnecessary weapons. This was the exact agreement that President Dorticos had proposed some three weeks earlier, a week before the crisis even began. What can be said about the role of the United States in the Cuban missile crisis? It is unclear whether or not Kennedy could have entirely avoided the situation, but it obvious that his actions were unnecessarily risky, without enough cause. By garabling with such high stakes when the outcome was so unpredictable and potentially disastrous, JFK was more willing than Khrushchev to risk a holocaust. In the 35-plus years since the crisis, nothing has surfaced that proves that Moscow ever had any intent other than the defensive position it claimed. Consider this statement made by Kruschev in his memoirs: The aim of the American aggressors was to destroy Cuba. Our aim was to preserve Cuba. Today Cuba exists. So who won? It cost us nothing more than the round-trip expenses for transporting the rockets to Cuba and back (Gaddis 278). With more open communication and less mistrust, it is possible that the tensions between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba might have been solved through diplomatic solutions before there ever was a Cuban missile crisis.
"…Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy- -or of a collective death-wish for the world" (Walton 142). -President John F.
Kennedy Although it is regarded as a highlight of President John F. Kennedy's career, the Cuban Missile Crisis may not have been the heroic act it appeared. Contrary to his own statement as quoted above, his choices in dealing with Khruschev and the Communist threat in Cuba put the world in extreme risk by forcing Moscow to choose only total surrender or total war. Due to fear, mistrust, and the desire to show political strength, JFK brought the Untied States and the world as close as it has ever been to global catastrophe. War was avoided, but there is room for doubt that this dangerous garable was necessary to create peace. On April 17, 1961, an invasion force comprised of anti-Castro Cubans, who had been trained by the United States government, landed on the shores of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. The intent was to overthrow Fidel Castro and implement a more U.S.-friendly government, but the force was crushed in an erabarrassing defeat. This left the world stunned. How could President Kennedy allow such a thing to happen? It marked the first of many events that led to the Cuban missile crisis, which occurred over a year later. The Bay of Pigs incident broke all of the little trust that the Cubans had left I the United States, and ignited the support of Castro by the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's strong backing of his ally was a direct result of the invasion. The day of the incident, he wrote a note to Washington expressing his unhappiness and pledging that he would give "all necessary assistance to Castro" (Walton p104). This in turn alarmed the U.S. The last thing a nation that was stricken with fear of Communism needed was Soviet support a mere 90 miles from its coast. With Cuba and the Soviets now banded together, it was only a matter of time before their interests would clash with those of the United States. There was good reason for a lack of trust on both sides. After the Bay of Pigs, JFK set up a special group of officials from the CIA and various defense agencies, which he called the "Special Group, Augmented" or SGA. The group's sole objective was to bring down Fidel Castro from the ranks of the Cuban government. They ordered "new radio propaganda, sabotage operations, more pressure on the OAS for the economic strangulation of Cuba, and…attempts to assassinate Castro" (Weisberger 216). Publicly, Kennedy said at a presidential news conference that he was "not for invading Cuba, at this time" (Walton 109). Surely both Castro and Khrushchev were threatened, not reassured, by that statement, making them even more convinced that the United States could not be trusted. Although Khrushchev had no actual knowledge of the U.S. plans to weaken Cuba, he was sure they would try to invade in the near future. In his mind, this justified his idea that Soviets should arm Cuba with defensive weapons including jet fighters, radar, anti-aircraft guns, and rockets that would prepare them for an attack. Up to this point, he had made his decisions open to the public. He resolved to go further with his plans, yet these would be kept secret, a military strategy which would drastically up the ante of mistrust. In May of 1962, he ordered the Cubans to create bases from which mid-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles could be launched. These missiles had the capability of carrying nuclear warheaRAB that could potentially threaten the entire southeastern United States. Whether Khrushchev's actions were typical military secrecy or not, he always maintained that his motives were purely defensive. He clearly felt no more wrong than the United States in its questionable military positioning in Turkey and other locations, and said as much in his Septeraber 11 statement: The whole world knows that the United States of America has ringed the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries with bases. What have they stationed there-tractors? …No, they have brought armaments there in their ships…They consider this their right! But to others the United States. does not permit this even for their defense. When measures are nonetheless taken to strengthen the defenses of this or that country the United States…declares that an attack is being prepared against them. What conceit! (Walton 111). On October 8, an event occurred that, if dealt with properly by the Kennedy administration, could have prevented the missile crisis from ever happening. Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos gave a speech to the General Asserably in which he not only confirmed the presence of missile bases in Cuba, but in return for an American promise not to invade Cuba, he offered to take them out and halt the threat of a nuclear war. He stated that they had "sufficient means with which to defend (them)selves," and continued to talk of the "weapons which (they) would have preferred not to acquire and which (they) do not wish to deploy." If the people on Kennedy's staff would have taken this offer more seriously, great fear could have been avoided. The most important part of the speech was when Dorticos attempted to propose a way to avoid conflict: Were the United States able to give up proof, by word and deed, that it would not carry out the aggression against our country, then, we declare solemnly before you here and now, our weapons would be unnecessary and our army redundant. We believe ourselves able to create peace (Larson 83). Even if the White House staff overlooked the admission of missiles, it is hard to believe they could ignore such a blatant plea for resolve. Kennedy either missed the crucial importance of this statement or he chose to jeopardize the lives of millions by risking nuclear war for reasons outside of the fact that the U.S. wanted the missiles out of Cuba (Walton p.115). Had Kennedy agreed to Moscow's diplomatic solution at this juncture, instead of taking the world to the brink of nuclear war, the crisis could have ended before it began. It was as inevitable that the missile installations in Cuba would be noticed by the CIA surveillance operations. On October 15, 1962, a U-2 reconnaissance plane's photographs confirmed that the Cubans had missile emplacements and the Cuban missile crisis began. It was assumed through these photos that the weapons were of the offensive nature, which caused great fear in the White House. Would the United States carry out what it had threatened only months earlier in Press Secretary Salinger's statement that if there was evidence of "offensive ground-to-ground missiles… the gravest issues would arise?"(Walton 110) President Kennedy was faced with the difficult decision of how to deal with this nuclear threat. The first action Kennedy took upon hearing the news was to asserable a special team of advisors of the people he trusted the most. He called this group the National Security Council, or ExCom. The aim of the committee was to consider the possibilities and devise a plan as quickly as possible while staying in complete confidentiality. Kennedy continued making speeches around the Midwest for a short while before retiring to the White House due to "a cold." Another issue plaguing ExCom was the time factor. Military advisors had notified the President that the systems could be operational within two weeks. This meant that the merabers of ExCom were going to have to work night and day in total secrecy. Within a few days, the group had come up with several plans of action to deal with the Cubans. The first two ideas presented were of an entirely different nature. One, which was backed by the "hawks," was an immediate air strike on the sections of Cuba, which had missile-launching capability. The problem with this plan was that although the strikes would be as precise as possible, there was no guarantee that no Russians or Cubans would not be killed. If casualties occurred, the tension between the three powers could escalate to a new level. The second idea was a strictly non-military response in which negotiations would take place and a clash would be avoided. Proponents of this concept, known as the "doves," were shot down by those who felt we couldn't trust the Russians (Weis 218-219). Kennedy even said of Khrushchev, "That son of a bitch won't pay attention to worRAB! He has to see you move" (Walton 116). ExCom was in serious need of a compromise. The solution came from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, as he proposed what would eventually become the Unites States' military plan. The U.S. Navy would set up a "quarantine" around the island, searching all Cuba-bound ships. They could then intercept any offensive weapons that might be on their way to Cuba. Even if this proposition failed, an air strike could still be attempted (Weisberger 219). Now that he had a set agenda, the President was ready to face the nation. John F. Kennedy stood in front of the network cameras on the night of Monday, Noveraber 22, and delivered one of the most terrifying speeches a president has ever given. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. …Action is required- and it is under way; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of the victory would be ashes in our mouth- -but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time must it be faced (Walton 125). It is important to note that the White House called these missiles "offensive" when they posed the same threat as our "defensive missiles" in Turkey. Calling them "offensive" was key to ensure the backing by the public of the extreme stance taken by the President. Then, as if provoking nuclear war with the Soviets, he delivered the most upsetting statement of all: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. President Kennedy had, in essence, put an ultimatum on the Soviet Union that had zero tolerance. In demanding surrender, he made already-poor relations with Khrushchev even worse. By making threats and taking this inflexible position, JFK brought the world one step closer to nuclear war. Kennedy had a variety of reasons for doing so, none of which were very appealing. Throughout this time, Kennedy faced relentless pressure from conservative Republican opponents, including senators Barry Goldwater, Hugh Scott, John Tower and especially Kenneth Keating (Fursenko and Naftali 205). They taunted him first for being slow to recognize the military buildup and then for doing nothing about it, implying that his leadership was weak. Although history has played down these political pressures on Kennedy's actions, with a congressional election coming up it would be impossible for him not to be thinking of how his choices as a Democrat would look in the polls in just a few weeks. In a personal letter, even Khrushchev accused Kennedy of being influenced by "reasons having to do with the election campaign in the USA"(Khrushchev 2). The day Kennedy announced his plan of action to the public, he confided to his brother, Robert, that he had fears that he could have been impeached by the unsupportive Congress had he not acted as he did (Lebow and Stein 97). Whether or not this had any grounRAB, it showed his feelings of political vulnerability. Once the blockade was in place, Kennedy had effectively backed Khrushchev into a corner where the only ways out were by facing humiliation or by resorting to nuclear war. This is essentially the same situation Kennedy claimed would be a "death wish for the world" (see top quote). As Kennedy maintained his demand for an unconditional surrender, Khrushchev was granted a way to back down yet save face. It came in the form of a letter by Acting Secretary General U Thant. He proposed that the United States "voluntarily suspend" it's quarantine measures and that the Soviet Union disarm Cuba. Khrushchev gladly accepted the message and made a statement declaring that the safety of the world should come before his country's desires. "I am not a czarist officer who has to kill myself if I fart at a masked ball," he proclaimed. "It is better to back down than to go to war"(Lebow and Stein 110). Kennedy did not share this attitude however. He was reluctant to agree to the terms outlined by U Thant, pressing for an unconditional surrender instead. As the Soviet ships plugged their way toward the blockade and possible conflict, U Thant sent a second letter in hopes of making peace. This letter urged both leaders to inform their vessels to avoid confrontation at all costs (Walton 131). Both agreed and it seemed as though the crisis would soon be over. On the 26th of October, Moscow sent a proposal that seemed reasonable to the White House. The Soviet Union would turn its ships around and either destroy or dismantle the missiles already present in Cuba as long as the United States agreed to never invade. The next morning a new message came demanding the U.S. pull it's missiles out of Turkey. In an attempt to show we would not give in to Soviet demanRAB, the second letter was ignored and the original one was accepted (Weis 223-225). The crisis was now over, yet with an ironic result. The United States gave its word that it would "not carry out aggression" on Cuba and the Soviet Union disposed of their unnecessary weapons. This was the exact agreement that President Dorticos had proposed some three weeks earlier, a week before the crisis even began. What can be said about the role of the United States in the Cuban missile crisis? It is unclear whether or not Kennedy could have entirely avoided the situation, but it obvious that his actions were unnecessarily risky, without enough cause. By garabling with such high stakes when the outcome was so unpredictable and potentially disastrous, JFK was more willing than Khrushchev to risk a holocaust. In the 35-plus years since the crisis, nothing has surfaced that proves that Moscow ever had any intent other than the defensive position it claimed. Consider this statement made by Kruschev in his memoirs: The aim of the American aggressors was to destroy Cuba. Our aim was to preserve Cuba. Today Cuba exists. So who won? It cost us nothing more than the round-trip expenses for transporting the rockets to Cuba and back (Gaddis 278). With more open communication and less mistrust, it is possible that the tensions between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba might have been solved through diplomatic solutions before there ever was a Cuban missile crisis.