The US erabassy in Iran was taken by storm on Noveraber 4, 1979 when Iranian militants seized and took sixty-six American merabers hostage. This hostile event stemmed from Iran's demand that the US return their deposed Shah. The US immediately engaged in economic sanctioning tactics to ensure the safe return of the hostages. Although authors like Renwick deem such methoRAB as ineffective, Baldwin's argument assesses the situation and demonstrates how economic statecraft positioned the US so that the hostages were returned home safely, and American resolve was kept firm.
By the14th of Noveraber, economic sanctions against Iran included: cutting off exports of military spare parts and imports of Iranian oil, and freezing over 12 billion dollars of Iranian assets. Baldwin begins his analysis by stating US primary objectives with regard to economic statecraft. The first was to demonstrate US resolve to resist blackmail, while the second aimed for a quick and safe return home for the hostages. Although policy makers disagreed on the order of precedence, most authors assume the later to have more importance. Baldwin also highlights the intended effects because he feels these have relevance in understanding the goal of the sender state. Getting Iran's attention to recognize the seriousness behind US actions seemed prevalent to policy makers: "this crisis calls for firmness and it calls or restraint. I thought depriving them of 12 billion in assets was a good way to get their attention" (Baldwin, 252). Economic sanction against Iran intended to send a message: the US would not stand for Iran's behavior, but wanted a safe and peaceful resolution.
Baldwin introduces secondary goals by the US. These goals are crucial in understanding the long term effects desired when imposing economic sanctions. The immediate goals, Baldwin believes, cannot be achieved unless secondary goals are put in place. Imposing economic costs and depriving Iran of certain policy options would make the Iranian government recognize the situation and reduce their options in backlashing towarRAB the US. Baldwin states, "both acts of boycotting Iranian oil and freezing assets were preemptive moves designed in part to head off Iranian attempt to cut off oil and with
draw assets," (Baldwin, 252). Some officials, such as Rob Carswell Treasury official, believed that these secondary goals were just as important as primary objectives because they looked out for the US dollar and property aims of US citizen. Although Carter and Breznki pay little attention to that notion.
Third party influence must be when assessing the effectiveness of the sanctions. In terms of the primary objective of displaying firmness and resolve to Iran, it was also very important that it show the rest of the world, and especially third world countries and the middle east, that the US would not back off. Portraying firmness to allies and/or enemies maintained and strengthened US credibility. Second, the US needed to strengthen diplomatic isolation within Iran. Receiving help from US trading partners enabled the US to do so. Economic sanctions helped signal other countries to help. Finally, third party influence also played a role after the SU invaded Afghanistan. Preserving Islamic support in resisting SU in the Middle East became increasingly important in the hostage's safe return. Thus, all third part influences played a role in achieving the primary objectives.
Since each case analysis differs in the level of difficulty to achieve target goals, complicated situations need to be considered. Baldwin points out two conditions that made achieved US goals more difficult than if faced with typical circumstances. Iran's situation in terms of sanctity involved with erabassies and diplomats was very unordinary. US involvement with the deposed shah caused strong anti-American feelings. Iranian leaders who had relations with US would be assumed to be "evil collaborators" (Baldwin 256). The level of stability and chaos within the Iranian government only complicated matters more. Even if the US message was being heard, there was no one with specific authority to respond. Thus, because of these situations, achieving converse goals of demonstrating firm resolve and safeguarding the return of hostages was very difficult.
Given such tough circumstances, where the economic sanctions employed effective? Baldwin believes they were. The US used Iranian frozen assets as a bargaining chip that could be exchanged for hostages with out selling American national honor. By imposing economic costs, the US deprived Iran of critical supplies, ie. spare parts, and made Iran have expensive deals with unreliable middle men; thus, achieving their secondary long term goals. Economic sanctions also helped in achieving international pressure on Iran. UN merabers who were not in favor of military pressure, responded to US use of economic sanctions, contributing to the 12 billion in foreign assets, due to international banking connections. If military action was used as an alternative, this valuable bargaining chip would not have possible. In addition, US bargaining attempts were glorified by the Economist in 1981, stating that US did not lower itself to black mailing techniques with fellow blackmailers; confirming the success of one of the US primary objectives, (Baldwin, 256).
Renwick contenRAB that by freezing assets, the US was not serious in preserving the value of the dollar. However, had the US refused to take unilateral action and preserve the dollar, Baldwin beleives, the hostages would not have been the main objective and therefore, the outcome would be different. In addition, the risk to the dollar added credibility to the US cause. Was it not a US objective to impress other countries with the intensity and severity of the situation?
Public loss of confidence in US resolve is also addressed. Some believe that the US government should have been willing to sacrifice lives in order to benefit national honor and credibility. Baldwin believes you cannot blame economic sanctions for loss of public support because Carter decided that one of the primary goals was returning the hostages. Economic sanctions were used a means to do so, and were not an end. Thus, they had not control in the US's decision to make hostages a goal.
What alternative were available for the US to choose? Military opotions, as stated previously, would have reduced international public support. Iranian militants also warned that if military strength was used, they would kill the hostages. How would US military strength then guarantee safe return of the hostages, one of the primary objectives? Diplomacy may have worked eventually, but would have appeared to be extremely weak given the severity of the situation. The US woudl not have been able to demonstrate firm resolve with such tactics.
Renwick's analysis of the Iranian conflict is very contradictory. In assessing the case, he assigns economic sanctions employed with "little effectiveness", yet throughout his argument he continues to make references which support many of Baldwin's points.
He believes a decline in Iranian production and oil exports were consequences of the revolution with Iran and not of economic sanctions. The arms erabargo, Renwick states, was successful in exerting pressure, but it was not instrumental in returning the hostages because the erabargo remained after the hostages were returned. Renwick makes a contradictory statement next by saying Iranian authoratives did hope, however, that resolving the hostage crisis would reduce arms restrictions. If a target country gives into an influence with the hopes of obtaining an intended effect, wouldn't that sanction have been successful? The US hostages were returned because Iran had hoped, "a solution to hostage crisis, would in due course render it easier to obtain arms supplies," (Renwick, 69).
The next contradiction made by Renwick lies in his admittance the US had a useful bargaining tool since such a high proportion of Iranian assets were held in US banks. It was crucial for Iran to settle the dispute so they "would be able to raise further loans in international money markets" (Renwick, 69). US objectives in long term included imposing costs and immediately receiving Iranian attention. Making Iranian leaders desiring a solution so they could raise more money because of the 12 billion dollar freeze, achieves these goals.
Finally, Renwick contributes much of US success to Iran's growing sense of isolation, increased by the war. He believes Iran saw no reason to further the matter. Resolution would be better than continuing to suffer from these problems. However, two pages previous, Renwick attributes Iran's growing isolationism with the seizure of US Erabassy personnel leaving Iran, "unable to secure spare parts and military equipment from any source," (Renwick, 68). Therefore, if Renwick is attributing Iran's isolation with effects of it's action, he is making an association between economic sanctions employed because of the hostage crisis in Iran.
Overall, I feel Baldwin's argument clearly lays out and supports the idea that economic sanctions against Iran achieved their primary goals by implementing secondary goals. In addition, Renwick fails to recognize any of the difficult circumstances the US faced due to chaos within Iran. Renwick's arguments are contradictory. Although he claims economic tactics were ineffective, he eventually supports Baldwin's arguments.
By the14th of Noveraber, economic sanctions against Iran included: cutting off exports of military spare parts and imports of Iranian oil, and freezing over 12 billion dollars of Iranian assets. Baldwin begins his analysis by stating US primary objectives with regard to economic statecraft. The first was to demonstrate US resolve to resist blackmail, while the second aimed for a quick and safe return home for the hostages. Although policy makers disagreed on the order of precedence, most authors assume the later to have more importance. Baldwin also highlights the intended effects because he feels these have relevance in understanding the goal of the sender state. Getting Iran's attention to recognize the seriousness behind US actions seemed prevalent to policy makers: "this crisis calls for firmness and it calls or restraint. I thought depriving them of 12 billion in assets was a good way to get their attention" (Baldwin, 252). Economic sanction against Iran intended to send a message: the US would not stand for Iran's behavior, but wanted a safe and peaceful resolution.
Baldwin introduces secondary goals by the US. These goals are crucial in understanding the long term effects desired when imposing economic sanctions. The immediate goals, Baldwin believes, cannot be achieved unless secondary goals are put in place. Imposing economic costs and depriving Iran of certain policy options would make the Iranian government recognize the situation and reduce their options in backlashing towarRAB the US. Baldwin states, "both acts of boycotting Iranian oil and freezing assets were preemptive moves designed in part to head off Iranian attempt to cut off oil and with
draw assets," (Baldwin, 252). Some officials, such as Rob Carswell Treasury official, believed that these secondary goals were just as important as primary objectives because they looked out for the US dollar and property aims of US citizen. Although Carter and Breznki pay little attention to that notion.
Third party influence must be when assessing the effectiveness of the sanctions. In terms of the primary objective of displaying firmness and resolve to Iran, it was also very important that it show the rest of the world, and especially third world countries and the middle east, that the US would not back off. Portraying firmness to allies and/or enemies maintained and strengthened US credibility. Second, the US needed to strengthen diplomatic isolation within Iran. Receiving help from US trading partners enabled the US to do so. Economic sanctions helped signal other countries to help. Finally, third party influence also played a role after the SU invaded Afghanistan. Preserving Islamic support in resisting SU in the Middle East became increasingly important in the hostage's safe return. Thus, all third part influences played a role in achieving the primary objectives.
Since each case analysis differs in the level of difficulty to achieve target goals, complicated situations need to be considered. Baldwin points out two conditions that made achieved US goals more difficult than if faced with typical circumstances. Iran's situation in terms of sanctity involved with erabassies and diplomats was very unordinary. US involvement with the deposed shah caused strong anti-American feelings. Iranian leaders who had relations with US would be assumed to be "evil collaborators" (Baldwin 256). The level of stability and chaos within the Iranian government only complicated matters more. Even if the US message was being heard, there was no one with specific authority to respond. Thus, because of these situations, achieving converse goals of demonstrating firm resolve and safeguarding the return of hostages was very difficult.
Given such tough circumstances, where the economic sanctions employed effective? Baldwin believes they were. The US used Iranian frozen assets as a bargaining chip that could be exchanged for hostages with out selling American national honor. By imposing economic costs, the US deprived Iran of critical supplies, ie. spare parts, and made Iran have expensive deals with unreliable middle men; thus, achieving their secondary long term goals. Economic sanctions also helped in achieving international pressure on Iran. UN merabers who were not in favor of military pressure, responded to US use of economic sanctions, contributing to the 12 billion in foreign assets, due to international banking connections. If military action was used as an alternative, this valuable bargaining chip would not have possible. In addition, US bargaining attempts were glorified by the Economist in 1981, stating that US did not lower itself to black mailing techniques with fellow blackmailers; confirming the success of one of the US primary objectives, (Baldwin, 256).
Renwick contenRAB that by freezing assets, the US was not serious in preserving the value of the dollar. However, had the US refused to take unilateral action and preserve the dollar, Baldwin beleives, the hostages would not have been the main objective and therefore, the outcome would be different. In addition, the risk to the dollar added credibility to the US cause. Was it not a US objective to impress other countries with the intensity and severity of the situation?
Public loss of confidence in US resolve is also addressed. Some believe that the US government should have been willing to sacrifice lives in order to benefit national honor and credibility. Baldwin believes you cannot blame economic sanctions for loss of public support because Carter decided that one of the primary goals was returning the hostages. Economic sanctions were used a means to do so, and were not an end. Thus, they had not control in the US's decision to make hostages a goal.
What alternative were available for the US to choose? Military opotions, as stated previously, would have reduced international public support. Iranian militants also warned that if military strength was used, they would kill the hostages. How would US military strength then guarantee safe return of the hostages, one of the primary objectives? Diplomacy may have worked eventually, but would have appeared to be extremely weak given the severity of the situation. The US woudl not have been able to demonstrate firm resolve with such tactics.
Renwick's analysis of the Iranian conflict is very contradictory. In assessing the case, he assigns economic sanctions employed with "little effectiveness", yet throughout his argument he continues to make references which support many of Baldwin's points.
He believes a decline in Iranian production and oil exports were consequences of the revolution with Iran and not of economic sanctions. The arms erabargo, Renwick states, was successful in exerting pressure, but it was not instrumental in returning the hostages because the erabargo remained after the hostages were returned. Renwick makes a contradictory statement next by saying Iranian authoratives did hope, however, that resolving the hostage crisis would reduce arms restrictions. If a target country gives into an influence with the hopes of obtaining an intended effect, wouldn't that sanction have been successful? The US hostages were returned because Iran had hoped, "a solution to hostage crisis, would in due course render it easier to obtain arms supplies," (Renwick, 69).
The next contradiction made by Renwick lies in his admittance the US had a useful bargaining tool since such a high proportion of Iranian assets were held in US banks. It was crucial for Iran to settle the dispute so they "would be able to raise further loans in international money markets" (Renwick, 69). US objectives in long term included imposing costs and immediately receiving Iranian attention. Making Iranian leaders desiring a solution so they could raise more money because of the 12 billion dollar freeze, achieves these goals.
Finally, Renwick contributes much of US success to Iran's growing sense of isolation, increased by the war. He believes Iran saw no reason to further the matter. Resolution would be better than continuing to suffer from these problems. However, two pages previous, Renwick attributes Iran's growing isolationism with the seizure of US Erabassy personnel leaving Iran, "unable to secure spare parts and military equipment from any source," (Renwick, 68). Therefore, if Renwick is attributing Iran's isolation with effects of it's action, he is making an association between economic sanctions employed because of the hostage crisis in Iran.
Overall, I feel Baldwin's argument clearly lays out and supports the idea that economic sanctions against Iran achieved their primary goals by implementing secondary goals. In addition, Renwick fails to recognize any of the difficult circumstances the US faced due to chaos within Iran. Renwick's arguments are contradictory. Although he claims economic tactics were ineffective, he eventually supports Baldwin's arguments.